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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, transnational practices conducted by Haitian
immigrants had a profound effect on the tumultuous transition of the Haitian
government. In his efforts to foster the ti legliz movement, Jean-Bertrand Aristide
essentially reshaped notions of territorial citizenship and political participation. As Glick
Schiller and Fouron (1998: 135) write, “…Aristide broke with classic definitions of the
bourgeois democratic nation-state in only one sphere – he redefined the location of
state so it was no longer confined within the territorial boundaries of Haiti.” Guarnizo
and Fouron (1998) “define their…emigrating populations as part and parcel of their
nation states” (131)
In his Lavalas’ Project of Government, a document Aristide published during his
presidential campaign, he overtly recruited Haitians living abroad to support his
movement. In doing so, he reshaped his political power to encompass all native
Haitians, regardless of where they might reside. In order to institutionalize these
overtures, Aristide actually met with members of the Haitian diaspora and publicly
claimed that they were, “no longer outside of Haiti although living abroad.” (Richman,
1992; Jean-Pierre, 1994; as cited in Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998:136) By actively
seeking assistance from the diaspora, Aristide garnered widespread support during his
time of exile. This had several key political effects: (1) Haitians living abroad lobbied
their home government in an effort to restore Aristide to power; (2) Haitians living
abroad attempted to influence their family and friends living in Haiti to pressure the

2

Haitian government; and (3) Haitians living in the United States supported Aristide’s
efforts to gain favor with the U.S. government and subsequently, made efforts to sway
U.S. foreign policy regarding Haiti.
Aristide went so far as to appoint a Chef de Mission to serve as direct attaché to
the Haitian consulate in New York.

This only further institutionalized the Haitian

diaspora, and cemented its place in Haitian politics although acting from abroad.
Haitians in New York were mobilized. They acted on behalf of the Haitian government,
even going so far as to demonstrate publicly when one key tenth Department official
(Wilson Desir) died. It was an action that amounted to as much as a “state funeral.”
(Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998:138)
Efforts within the U.S. receiving communities to mobilize the Haitian diaspora
took on a decidedly ethnic flair (Glick Schiller 1975, 1977 and Glick Schiller and Fouron,
1998). “The word was communicated through political speeches, patronage, ethnic
festivals, invitations to City Hall, and in the case of Haitian organizations, funding from
city, state, federal and philanthropic agencies. Haitian immigrants were invited to join
the Mayor’s Commission on Ethnic Affairs. They were also encouraged to organize
support groups for mayoral candidates and to cast their votes for politicians who spoke
to the Caribbean immigrant experience.” (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998). In these
instances, we see the establishment of a transnational political identity that is directly
linked to participation in the political institutions of the receiving community.
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The use of these mechanisms only escalated. U.S. political candidates went so far as to
suggest that to obtain U.S. citizenship and vote in U.S. elections was a means by which
Haitian residents of the United States could help influence electoral outcomes in Haiti.
(Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998)
Although various efforts to incorporate the Haitian diaspora into U.S. and Haitian
politics succeeded at further entrenching a sense of interconnectedness with the
homeland, there were discursive effects as well. Glick Schiller and Fouron (1998)
enumerate them as follows, paraphrased here:

(1)

Homeland dependency on

remittances from the diaspora spawned resentment. The homeland Haitians were
resentful of perceived prosperity of the diaspora; at the same time, the diaspora grew
increasingly resentful of the “burden” of remitting a substantial portion of their income
back home; (2) Those who stayed behind in Haiti felt increasingly threatened by the
prospect of a repatriated diaspora that had developed an increased professional skill
base and language competency since they had departed; (3) Divin over the potential
privatization was spot-lighted – diaspora thinks that privatizing utilities in Haiti will allow
them better job prospects if they return, and families receiving remittances support this
as well. However, families lacking assistance, see this as an expensive development in
an already financially stressed existence. They would pay more for less, in a sense.
Politically, the experience of the diaspora came to bear as well. The personal
disjuncture described above lead to the creation of political cleavages. (Glick Schiller
and Fouron, 1998:153). Economic effects, political leadership, position on policy, etc.
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In his study of Haitian migrants, Laguerre (2006) suggests that the diaspora is itself a
“transnational political system,” maintained by structures within the homeland and
receiving community. He argues that this super-structure allows diasporic refugees to
shift their political engagements from the home system to the receiving system,
depending on what goals the diaspora seeks to attain throughout its evolution.

He

writes:
With regard to the role of place or location in diasporic politics, we will see
how different relations with different segments of the diaspora depend on
the nature of the political process in either site or the projected goal
contemplated. A specific diasporic site may be called upon for help by the
homeland government to achieve a specific outcome, while another site
may be contacted for a different reason. Similarly, a specific hostland
government may at times use the services of the local diaspora in its
diplomatic and trade relations with the homeland, while at other times it
may simply ignore such cosmopolitan political actors.

This process of political bargaining plays out rather simply, although it occurs
across a complex plane. Laguerre’s diasporic populations exerted pressure on the
Haitian government from their position in their U.S. receiving community. They do this
via mechanisms available to them in the receiving community, especially if the receiving
community is democratic, such as diplomatic appeals, pubic demonstration, and
mobilization of the diaspora toward some specific political aim. They do this also by
communicating directly their efforts and progress back to their social network within
the homeland with potential for either positive or negative reaction by the home
government. Put plainly, “Diasporic politicians operate inside diasporic organizations,
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inside the formal organizations of the sending and receiving states, and within the
transnational tentacles of the political institutions of the homeland and the host land.
At times, they use one institution (e.g., the Democratic Party in the United States) to
consolidate another (the electoral process in the homeland),” (Laguerre, 2006: 3). For
example, the Haitian diaspora in the United States actually used their numbers to garner
political influence and expertise from US and Haitian officials working within the United
Nations and the US government. They later returned to Haiti empowered to form
coalitions that could leverage real political change. Laguerre labels this a “transnational
stretch of state institution” (2006:3). Others have gone so far as to describe these
outcomes of transnational political action as the emergence of some sort of post-state,
a sphere of action and influence that transcends both domestic and international
political arenas (Basch et al, 1994).

In particular, instances of ex-patriate voting

illustrate the blurring of traditional political boundaries. Al-Ali (2001) points Eritrean
voting numbers during the 1993 Referendum for Independence whereby a total of
84,370 citizens voted while living outside of Eritrea.
Sladjan arrived in New York Laguardia Airport at 15 years old, a refugee of the
1990s ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia.

He maintains both US and Bosnian

citizenship. Although he has lived in the United States for 14 years, he keeps close ties
with friends and family still living in the Bosnian city in which he was born. He travels to
Bosnia and Croatia at least once every year, some years more frequently. Although in
his view he does not participate in Bosnian political affairs in any overt fashion, he
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admits to using the social networking website Facebook to monitor other Bosnian’s
views on political events that occur in Bosnia and express his opinions about Bosnian
political events. Sladjan explained that he belongs to a “political” Facebook forum
called “REVOLT!”

Most “REVOLT!” members are young – age 18 to 30, and the

majority indicate they live in Bosnia. Discussion threads typically spotlight complaints
about the Bosnian government, Bosnian politicians or such issues as community policing
and corruption. Sladjan describes REVOLT! as “some sort of a political movement.”
When I asked him why he takes interest in the group or Bosnian political affairs for that
matter, Sladjan replied, “At the end of the day, Bosnia is home. I don’t consider myself
to be a man of one country.”
Edi, an Albanian political asylee, relocated to the United States in 1994. He
openly describes himself as “politically active” with respect to issues affecting the
Albanian population residing in Southeastern Michigan, and he uses various political
channels to affect policy changes that would improve the circumstance of ethnic
Albanians locally. However, his political activism transcends local boundaries. Recently,
Edi and several of his colleagues wrote letters to their U.S. Congressional representative,
requesting that the Member take a stand against the Albanian government’s prolonged
detainment of two political prisoners. In response, their Congressman sent letters to
officials in the Albanian government requesting the prisoners’ release. About two
weeks after I interviewed him, Edi met with the same U.S. Congressman and a retired
U.S. Army General (and former contender for the Democratic Party’s presidential
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nomination) at an event hosting several thousand ethnic Albanians residing in Suburban
Detroit. Discussion topics included the most recent Presidential election in Albania, the
Albanian economy, Albania’s bid for membership in the European Union (EU), and U.S.
immigration and citizenship reform.
Milosh, a twenty-five year old Kosovar refugee, also maintains a substantive
connection with his homeland. He explained, “It’s basically how I was raised. I have
very close ties with extended family, like uncles, aunts, and first cousins. There is also
the fact that I’ve gone so often – I go every summer and stay for extended periods of
time, like four to six weeks every summer, so that has helped. And with that…it feels
like as if I’ve never left there.” He went on to describe his sense of duality about being
from Kosovo but carving out a life in the United States, “A lot of people tell you that
they’re physically here, but their heart and soul is there. That is how I feel, and it is
because of these connections. It does not have to do anything with the U.S. being bad
to me or having something done negative to me – it’s the complete opposite. I am who
I am. Part of it is because I have lived in the U.S., and I’ve become a better person living
in the U.S. But I feel an emotional connection to Kosovo. It is one of the reasons I plan
on keeping dual citizenship.” Milosh’s connection to his homeland also has turned
toward the political. He said that he is involved in U.S. political affairs and Kosovar
political affairs simultaneously and to the same degree. Interestingly, when I asked him
to provide an example of a political action he completed with respect to Kosovar
politics, he discussed a U.S. protest he attended on behalf of Macedonian political
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prisoners.

Milosh explained, “The protest was about wanting a fair trial for

Montenegrins suspected of terrorism in Montenegro – domestic terrorism…It was a
protest in D.C. We wanted to make sure that the U.S. required and asked and pressured
the Montenegro government to give a fair and speedy trial to the 14 that were accused,
three of which were U.S. citizens.”
I am interested in understanding these political actions as a relevant component
of contemporary transnationalism.

Ever-increasing international migration rates

coupled with enhanced technology and accessible transportation have created a venue
for more transnational political action than ever before. Although migrants have always
sustained some tie with their homeland, there is more opportunity than ever to commit
political actions remotely from the receiving community that have a political effect on
structures in a distant homeland. When political actions are committed en mass, as
with many diasporas, they can have tangible political effects in both sending and
receiving communities. For example, absentee voting and political party contributions
from exiles living afar can influence sending state election results. This pattern of
affecting political outcomes in absentia holds important implications for our
understanding of the bounded nation-state and traditional political structures. As Levitt
et al (2003) argue, “Because migrants' local political agency and institutions are shaped
not only by local discourses and modes of organization but also by global factors such as
rights regimes, traditional ideas about political transparency and accountability need to
be revisited.”
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More specifically, I am interested in how the presence of conflict in the sending
state may or may not affect migrants’ ability and desire to act in the political spheres of
both the sending and receiving states. Conflict migrants typically depart their homeland
as refugees. They leave with little time preparation, scant opportunities to establish
support systems to receive them post-resettlement, and often would not have chosen
to relocate had conflict not forced them. Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) writes of the
consequences of forced migration.

Omitting implications for population size and

economic capital, I paraphrase her conclusions: 1.) Forced migration changes migrants’
collective self-perception and their perceptions of others, which in turn, influences inand out-group relations; 2.) Being forced to leave one’s homeland creates a new chapter
in a culture’s shared memories and historical experiences. This shapes the group’s
“value orientations and behavior patterns.” 3) Forced migration effects domestic politics
and international relations within and between states. How then does their status as
conflict migrants affect political action and outcomes in sending and receiving
communities? To which political structure, if any, do conflict migrants belong? And
how does their political activism or withdrawal compare to that of migrants who chose
to relocate and as such, prepared for their resettlement?
Interstate migration is understood most simply as a human activity resulting in a
shift of primary residence from one nation or state to another. But as Sladjan, Edi and
Milosh demonstrate, much has changed since the “old” migration of the early Twentieth
Century. Levitt et all (2003) explain, “Today, new technologies of communication and
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transportation allow migrants to sustain more frequent, less expensive, and more
intimate connections than before. Such technologies enable migrants to remain active
in their sending communities more regularly and influentially than in the past.” While
bifocal existence is not entirely new, increased access to the homeland postresettlement offers increased opportunity for political action and potential for much
more profound results. Additionally, increased tolerance of dual citizenship by both
sending and receiving states allows migrants to institutionalize their dual political
actions.
Unprecedented

advancements

in

communications

and

transportation

technology have availed today’s migrants the opportunity to trade home for home,
place for place. We can gather up-to-the-minute information about faraway places with
remarkable accuracy, and if we choose, we can remain consistently involved in the
social and political spheres of more than one “homeland.” Truly, individuals are no
longer tied to one locality, one set of institutions, and even one legal citizenship status.
When contemporary migrants choose to engage in a transnational existence, the
possibilities for influence on both home and receiving communities are quite profound.
Today’s transnationalism results in transformed identities, new networks, and multilevel social, economic and political action. (Glick Schiller et al, 1992) This challenges our
evaluation of contemporary interstate movement and its effects on sending and
receiving states. Portes and Rumbaut (2006: 13) write, “…[immigration] theories coined
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in the wake of the European’s arrival at the turn of the century have been made largely
obsolete by events during these last decades.”

Although there is a robust literature reviewing transnationalism, we lack
adequate understanding of transnational political opportunity structures, especially for
migrants, and the degree to which migrants choose to (or are able to) engage politically
in their home and receiving communities, along with any resulting effects on politics in
either locale. Additionally, we need to understand that differences in departure and
arrival conditions may influence political behavior.

The element of force or

“involuntariness” that exists for refugees creates a set of circumstances at departure
and throughout resettlement that is different than those experienced by other migrants.
How might these differences in departure conditions influence migrants’ political
behavior in their home and receiving communities? Do they choose to participate more
frequently in the homeland or receiving community? What other factors influence their
behavior?
The field lacks comparative views in this regard as well. Since I am interested in
how conflict affects migration experiences and resultant political behavior, I compare
conflict and non-conflict migrant activity.

I conduct within-group comparisons to

examine first whether refugees participate in politics more so in their homeland or
receiving community. I then compare political behavior among refugees and nonconflict migrants to assess between-group differences in transnational participation.
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Although previous research seeks to understand various social and economic
differences between forced and voluntary migrants groups, this is the first such study
employing comparative statistical methods to assess differences in political behavior.
This is unique also in that I focus on three distinct migration flows from the Balkan
region – Bosnians, Kosovars and Albanians who migrated to the United States between
1990 and 2009. I selected these groups for several reasons: (1) They departed the same
region of the world within the same time period; (2) I located a U.S. community in which
all three groups had established significant enclaves; (3) All groups heralded from postCommunist societies; (4) Conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo displaced people within those
jurisdictions during the 1990s. While conflict also affected ethnic Albanians residing in
Albania during the Kosovar conflict, conflict did not displace any of the respondents to
whom I spoke who had resided in Albania. All of the Bosnians and Kosovars with whom
I spoke relocated to the United States with refugee status.

All of the Albanian

participants (from Albania - excluding those Albanians from Kosovo) entered with
immigration status pertaining to work or education.
Migrants occupy different types of political space depending on their migration
experience, amount of social capital, and degree of incorporation in both societies.
Those migrants who relocate for labor or educational opportunities likely have different
assets and attitudes than migrants who were forced to relocate due to conflict. Put
simply, I suggest that with respect to political participation, (1) conflict migrants are
more engaged in their sending state than in their receiving state; and (2) conflict
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migrants participate more in the sending state than migrants whose movement was
driven by other factors. In other words, conflict-driven migrants occupy a greater
transnational political space than “voluntary” migrants, or those migrants who relocated
due to economic, educational other factors typically deemed within their domain. The
aspect of choice in relocation suggests that voluntary migrants may be more apt to turn
away from politics in the home state in favor of forging a new political identity that
compliments their motivations for relocation, be those motivations familial,
professional, educational, etc.
In order to ground this effort within an existing theoretical framework, I devote
Chapter 2 to reviewing literature conceptualizing globalization, nationalism, and
transnationalism.

I discuss also transnational communities and diasporas.

I then

summarize efforts toward understanding transnational political participation and the
factors that influence transnational political action. Within this, it is important also to
review work highlighting the role sending and receiving states play in determining
migrants’ access to political institutions and ability to incorporate in both communities.
I conclude Chapter 2 with a discussion of the Haitian diaspora as an illustrative example
of contemporary transnational political phenomena.

This well-documented case

illuminates the complexity of transnational political participation, and provides further
justification for my rational and approach. In Chapter 3, I explain my research approach
and study methodology, including definition of variables and statistical tests. I devote
Chapter 4 to describing the research population. Chapter 5 summarizes results related
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to my first hypothesis, and in Chapter 6, I summarize my second hypothesis. In Chapter
7, I review results and place them within the existing literature framework.
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW
Since 1970, worldwide international migration has more than doubled.
According to the United Nations, in 2010 there were approximately 214 million people
residing in a country other than where they were born. From 2005 to 2010 alone, the
number of international migrants rose by 12 percent, or 23 million people. Most
migrants sought shores of more developed regions including European Union (EU)
countries, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. But the United States led the pack with a
3.2 percent increase in the number of migrants received every year since 1990. The
United States is home to the largest number of international migrants of any country in
the world -- some 42.8 million foreign-born residents, or 20 percent of the world’s
international migrants.1 Foreign-born residents accounted for nearly 12 percent of the
total U.S. population reported by the U.S. Census Bureau.2
Not only is today’s migrant flow growing, but it is more diverse than the migrant
streams of just 50 years ago. Whereas turn-of-the-century U.S. immigrants were largely
from European countries, immigrants now arrive in the United States from every region
of the world, from every nation imaginable. Departing both developed and developing
countries, today’s migrants come forth from a broader spectrum of economic and social
circumstances than those who came before them.
1

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division 17, International
Migration Report 2009: A Global Assessment

2

Luke J. Larsen, The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2003, Current Population Reports, P20551, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C.
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Yet amid transition, one constant remains. For as long as people have crossedborders, so too have they maintained a connection to home. Weber (1978: 388) wrote
of “heimatsgefühl” – translated literally as “home feeling,” but referring to memories of
home. This nostalgia or longing for the “old ways” persists in migrant’s lives long after
resettlement, even after repatriation becomes unlikely.
Naturally, most migrants thus experience some sense of duality. This might
manifest in frequent trips back to the homeland, support sent to family and friends via
financial remittances, and even first-hand participation in political and social life abroad.
Contemporary technological innovations foster greater access to information about the
homeland, more communication with homeland networks, and new modes of
institutional participation. By allowing departed subjects to maintain dual citizenship,
many states have softened their borders and redefined political participation structures
to include expatriates.

Such multi-faced access to the homeland has led to new

opportunities for transnational awareness, interactions, activities and identities. As
such, our notions of political space and incorporation are ever-evolving. Glick Schiller
and Fouron (1998) write:
There is something within the experience of being a transmigrant
that does transcend borders and boundaries both of the state and of the
conceptual terrain mapped by states. To be forced to migrate from your
home with a dream of a better life, to confront difficult economic
conditions and racism instead of a world of prosperity and security, and
to map out transnational connections as a strategy of personal and
cultural survival is to enter a realm not totally penetrated by dominant
ideas and practices.
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What does having a transnational existence mean for migrants’ desire and ability
to become political actors? Do migrants have opportunities to act politically in one or
both of their affiliated communities? And if opportunities are present, do they seek to
participate or to withdraw? Truly no two migration experiences are the same. Foner
(1997:23) writes, “some groups are likely to be more transnational than others – and we
need research that explores and explains the differences. Within immigrant groups,
there is also variation in the frequency, depth and range of transnational ties.” So, it is
unlikely that tendencies toward or away from transnational political activities are the
same for all migrants. What are these variances, and what causes them?
Given differences in departure conditions, it stands to reason that migrants who
were forced from their homeland may exhibit different political behavior than migrants
driven by labor and educational opportunities. Wood (1994) suggests the experiences of
forced and voluntary migrants are similar. He includes among their shared challenges,
“…declining real incomes, and large personal investments in the migration process;
disparities of incomes and opportunities between the place of origin and potential
destinations; kinship networks that provide critical information and support; new
experiences of ethnic tension and discrimination as an ‘outsider’; loss of traditional
social status; new educational and language barriers; and weakening of traditional
values in the face of powerful, foreign cultural forces.” However, I point to differences
in financial and social capital, lack of pre-migration planning and preparation and the
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trauma of forced migration as factors likely producing a marked difference between
conflict and non-conflict migrants.
To explore these ideas further, I first review literature examining migration
generally as well as the accepted typology describing different types of migrants. I then
conceptualize transnationalism within the context of globalization, and I define
transnational communities and diasporas. I review literature discussing transnational
political participation, highlighting factors known to influence transnational political
participation.

Modern Migration
The essential construct within migration theory is the simple “push-pull”
dichotomy (Ravenstein, 1889). Ravenstein proposed that such internal factors as poor
economic conditions, political instability, and oppression “push” people to migrate.
External opportunities such as better job markets and improved living conditions act
concurrently to “pull” people away. Ensuing theory expounds on the push-pull process,
laying the framework for contemporary world systems approaches. A neo-classical
macroeconomic approach views voluntary movement as the result of a choice between
wage differentials in the sending and receiving communities. Put simply, if wages
abroad are higher than wages at home, people will feel incentivized to relocate. A neoclassical microeconomic approach suggests that individuals factor more than
information about wage differentials into their decision-making process. Likelihood of
obtaining employment, cost of relocation, and an individual’s education and skill levels
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come into play in the individual’s decision to relocate. Invoking Ravenstein, Lee (1966)
defined the notion of such “intervening obstacles” as distance and prohibitive receiving
state institutions influence migration flows as well.
When voluntary migration occurs, it is a result of optimal choice. In order for
optimal choice to emerge, three factors must be present: (1) demand for migrant labor;
(2) awareness of demand for migrant labor; and (3) desirable opportunities. (Portes and
Rumbaut, 2006: 17) The act of actually relocating internationally is an incredible
individual investment.

If the move promises a high return on investment, most

individuals will take the plunge. Once labor-driven movement is established, other
factors begin to incite reciprocal migration. Family ties, entrepreneurial opportunities,
and a promise of ongoing economic or social support incentivize additional movement
over time.
Richmond (1993) sums up the difference between conflict and non-conflict
migration most concisely, writing that voluntary migration is “proactive” while refugee
movement is “reactive.”

As Kunz (1973) points out, the involuntary “push” driving

refugees out of their home state creates circumstances that are different from those of
other immigrants. These include trauma (mental and physical), loss of contact with key
family and social networks, and change in socioeconomic status post-resettlement. The
result on refugee psychology includes an incredibly complex interplay of altered history,
compromised culture, and political exile.
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To summarize so-called migrant “types,” I borrow Portes’ and Rumbault’s (2006:
p. 18-33) immigration typology. They propose that contemporary migrants fall into one
of the following categories:
•

Labor Migrants – Labor migrants are contract laborers, seasonal workers, and
individuals who, for the most part, are motivated to relocate by the prospect of
obtaining a low-skill job.

•

Skilled Professionals – Skilled professionals are individuals with advanced
degrees, often in medical, technical, engineering, and research fields. Whereas
we might view labor migrants as driven by unemployment or lack of opportunity,
professionals are driven by new career opportunities and the promise of an
improved work environment.

•

Entrepreneurial Immigrants – Entrepreneurial immigrants relocate to reunite
with comprise “ethnic enclaves” that have already settled in their receiving
community. Entrepreneurs access sufficient capital and labor to sustain a
business that, in turn, supports the enclave.

•

Refugees and Asylees - Refugees and asylees are individuals who relocated “not
as a matter of personal choice, but a governmental decision based on a
combination of legal guidelines and political expediency.” (Portes and Rumbault,
2006: 31-32) Refugee status is conferred on migrants forced from their home
country, while asylees are have already fled their country of origin and cannot
return.

I view labor migrants, skilled professionals and entrepreneurial immigrants as
belonging to a broad “non-conflict” group.

Although certainly migrants represent

distinct groups and present a unique set of defining characteristics, their migration was
not driven by violent conflict. Likewise, I distinguish refugees as a second research
group since their experience was driven by conflict and therefore illustrates sharp
differences between non-conflict and conflict-driven experiences.
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Evolving Transnationalism
Marx (1848) forecasted that industrial capitalism would “annihilate space,” and
new interstate economic relationships would lead to “intercourse in every direction, a
universal interdependence of nations.” Wallerstein’s (1974) following world systems
theory frames the scope of global capitalism more specifically. He argued that the
Western European feudal crisis lasting from about 1300-1450 gave way to global
expansion of domestic economic systems. Western European powers pushed beyond
their borders, seeking labor supplies in less developed foreign lands. Via colonialism,
“core” European powers constructed steadfast economic dependencies between
themselves and less powerful “periphery” states. In doing so, capitalism transformed
from a bounded domestic economic structure to an international system of complex
multi-state interdependence based on interplays between inequality and power. World
systems theory thus allows us to examine states as actors on a global plane and a world
economy rather than geographically bounded political and economic silos.
These early contemplations ushered the development of modern globalization
theory. To paraphrase Basch et al (1994:11-12) and Kearney (1995:548), we can define
globalization as a broad set of social, economic, cultural and demographic practices that
transcend national borders. Sassen (1998) writes, "a good part of globalization consists
of an enormous variety of micro-processes that begin to denationalize what had been
constructed as national - whether policies, capital, political subjectivities, urban spaces,
temporal frames, or any other of a variety of dynamics and domains."
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Globalization has had sweeping effects on the international system. For one, the
interconnectedness of labor and product markets provides broader access to consumer
goods and labor opportunities. While this increases access to affordable technologies
and innovative products, globalization critics note also that it also incites concerns about
wage fairness, worker safety, environmental conditions, and the broadening political
and economic influence of multi-national corporations. Globalization scholars argue
also that increased economic interconnectedness renders states more vulnerable to the
effects of economic collapse in far-away locations, since they are increasingly depending
on each other for labor, goods and services.
In the scope of this research, I am most concerned with globalization’s impact on
international migration. Without a doubt, globalization increases movement. It also
opens the door for more access to information and various means of communication,
meaning that we all have greater exposure to other cultures, languages, and ideas.
Globalization encourages transnationalism. With more people relocating, greater ease
in communicating back and traveling to the homeland, and increased political and
economic cooperation between states, individuals have an enhanced ability to observe
and act in more than one location at a time.
Faist (2000) suggests that globalization, nationalism, and transnationalism are
three fields entwined, but different. He sums the differences between globalization and
transnationalism most concisely by saying that globalization involves “deterritorialized”
processes while transnational processes are tied to two or more nation states, and
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therefore, not “denationalized.” (Faist, 2000: 210-11; cited also by Kivisto, 2001, 566).
Transnationalism is thus related to globalization and migration as a resultant process,
but it differs in that it is “anchored in and transcend[s] one or more nation states rather
than occurring in a global space.” (Kearney, 1995a: 548; also cited in Mahler, 1998)
Despite globalization’s destabilization of the notion of states as free-standing
entities, Glick Schiller et al (1992) point out that the nation-state persists as the primary
structure by which we organize and govern. Brubaker (1996: 14) defines a nation as
“collective

individuals

capable

of

coherent,

purposeful

collective

action.”

Conceptualizing transnationalism requires developing some understanding of nationalist
loyalty as an organizing principle, even when those loyalties transcend traditional state
boundaries. To be sure, even in a transnational existence, action is formed first around
the national, whether encouraged by the state or sought out by the individual.
Brubaker (1996: 5) writes of “transborder nationalisms” as being these “external
national homelands” that establish obligations and responsibilities transcendent of
geographic boundaries and legal citizenship. Yet, globalization and transnationalism do
challenge traditional concepts of the nation-state.

Questions of jurisdiction, over-

lapping institutions and citizenship are not easily answered.
This becomes further complex considering that in contemporary life, an
individual’s national associations may change repeatedly over time. Hobsbawm (1990)
reminds that states exist only “in the context of a particular stage of technological and
economic development.” Just as the state takes on multiple identities over time, it is
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possible also to assume multiple national loyalties and affiliations, be they self-ascribed
or imposed.
Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton-Blanc. (Glick Schiller, Basch
et al. 1992; Glick Schiller, Basch et al. 1992; Basch, Glick Schiller et al. 1994; Glick
Schiller, Basch et al. 1995; Szanton-Blanc, Basch et al. 1995; Glick Schiller and Fouron
1998) contend that contemporary immigrants engage in different social, cultural and
political processes than those who came before them. In other words, today’s migrants
are transnational; yesterday’s were not. They argue that migrants of yesteryear became
immersed in their receiving communities, and broke ties with the homeland, whereas
contemporary immigrants’ “…networks, activities, and patterns of life encompass both
their home and host societies. Their lives cut across social boundaries and bring two
societies into a single social field.” (Basch, Glick Schiller et al. 1994)
But transnationalism is not a new phenomenon.

While the degree and

frequency of interaction with the homeland has changed with the rising tides of
globalization, most immigrants have always maintained some sort of tie to the
homeland via kinship networks, financial remittances or more structured means of
economic and political participation. Portes credits improved communications and
transportation technology with paving the way for a viable, accessible transnational
space wherein immigrants can interact with the homeland, and to some degree, exert
influence within the homeland from their receiving state. (Portes and Rumbaut 1990;
Portes 1999; Portes, Guarnizo et al. 1999) Kivisto (2001: 555) and Morawska (1999)
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support this contention in later work, making clear that although today’s migrants may
exist in more defined transnational spaces, past migrants were always connected to
loved ones left behind, and financial remittances have long played a heavy hand in
shaping interactions between home- and hostlands.
Vertovec (1999) summarizes no fewer than six discursive transnationalism
themes, paraphrased here: (1) a new “border spanning” form of social organization; (2)
a “diasporic consciousness;” (3) a mode of cultural reproduction; (4) a mode of “cultural
reproduction” akin to hybridity; (5) a site of dual-state and extra-state political
engagement; and (6) a shift from concepts of space that focus on local domains to those
that are “translocal” in their reach. I do not find these themes to be mutually exclusive.
Transnationalism is at once all of these things with varying intensity. Although atypical,
some migrants do not experience a transnational existence at all.

For some,

transnationalism is a conscious means of staying connected to the cultural, social and
political. For others, transnational activity manifests from an instinctual tie to the
familial and a yearning for connectedness. However exercised, transnationalism crafts
evolving notions of community.

Transnational Communities and Diasporas
Faist focuses on transnationalism as a new social space between nation-states
that is constructed by transnational processes. Kivisto (2001: 565) summarizes this as
follows, “…the idea of transnational space treats the migratory system as a boundarybreaking process in which two (usually) or more nation-states are penetrated and
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become part of a singular new social space.” Within Faist’s “transnational space” ideas,
cultured, and resources circulating among migrants create transcendent social, cultural,
political and economic networks. These networks, comprised of “transmigrants,”
become communities in and of themselves. In completing actions between the sending
state and the receiving state, transmigrants occupy a unique space.

They are

simultaneously influenced by more than one system and influential in more than one
system.
Glick Schiller et al (1992: 1-2) strike the most oft-cited definitions for
contemporary “transmigration” and “transmigrants.” They write,
We have defined transmigration as the processes by which immigrants build
social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of
settlement. Immigrants who build such social fields are designated
“transmigrants.” Transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations –
familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span
borders. Transmigrants take actions, make decisions, feel concerns, and
develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more
societies simultaneously.

Roberts, Frank and Lozano-Ascencio (1999:239) suggest then that, “transnational
migrant communities’ are groupings of immigrants who participate on a routine basis in
a field of relationships, practices, and norms that include both places of origin and
places of destination.” Portes characterizes this transnational domain as being
somewhat symmetrical -- composed of a growing number of persons who live dual lives
in the sense that they speak two languages, own homes in two countries, earn a living
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through transactions spanning national borders, and in many cases, maintain dual
citizenship. (Portes et al, 1999:217; also see in Kivisto, 2001:560).
This duality extends beyond the construction of interstate transnational spaces
as we understand them. Faist’s (2000) transnational communities are not limited to
territoriality, but rather, reliant on tangible social and cultural bonds.

These

“communities without propinquity” span more than one nation-state at one point in
time. (See also Glick Schiller et al 1992: 11, and Vertovec 1999: 450.) Vertovec (1999)
calls these transnational communities “social formations that transcend physical
borders,” and he suggests there are five conceptual tenets inherent to transnationalism
theory: consciousness, means of cultural reproduction, link to capital, point of political
engagement and reconstruction of place (See also Al-Ali et al., 2001).

Gupta and

Ferguson (1992: 9) note the fundamental impact created by altering this space, “…it has
enabled the creation of forms of solidarity and identity that do not rest on an
appropriation of space where contiguity and face-to-face contact are paramount.”
Kivisto (2001:569) elaborates, “…transnational migrants are engaged in activities
designed to define and enhance their position in the receiving nation, while
simultaneously seeking to remain embedded in a participatory way in the everyday
affairs of the homeland community…” Guarnizo and Smith (1998, 21) also view
transnational identity formation within a context of “embedding and disembedding.” As
they put it, “Identity is contextual, but not radically discontinuous. People seek to be
situated, to have a stable mooring, an anchor amidst the tempest…”
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This desire for mooring may play a role in diaspora formation. As Clifford
describes, “loss and hope [are] a defining tension” of all diasporas. Vertovec calls upon
earlier work from Sheffer (1986) and Safran (1991) to summarize the “triadic
relationship” contained within diaspora as “…globally dispersed yet collectively selfidentified ethnic groups; the territorial states and contexts where such groups reside;
the homeland states and contexts whence they and their forebears came.”

Safran

(ibid) highlights defining features of a diaspora, including the occupation of at least two
communities outside the homeland, share a common memory of their shared
experience and a feeling of expulsion, or at least, a belief that they “cannot be fully
accepted by their host country.” Diasporas often envision eventual repatriation, and as
such, they become quite involved in homeland projects and continued development of
the communities they left behind. Safran concludes that this ongoing involvement with
the homeland plays an important role in establishing political identity.
While once a free-standing concept, “diaspora” is increasingly difficult to
distinguish from “transnational community.” Vertovec (1998, xvi) explains, “’Diaspora’
is the term often used today to describe almost any population which is considered
“deterritorialized” or “transnational” that is, which has originated in a land other than
where it currently resides and whose social, economic, and political networks cross the
borders of nation-states, or indeed, span the globe.”
Both transnational communities and diasporas are affected politically by their
status as migrants living apart from the homeland. Vertovec (1998, xviii) writes that
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their “political interests are often ignited by the “political plight” of the homeland.”
However, it is unclear how and to what degree transnational communities and
diasporas are affected. In his study of Croats residing in Sweden, Frykman (2001: 169)
writes, “…it is yet to be seen whether it [exile] provides a new “enemy” against which
diaspora groups might solidarize, or whether they will make diaspora Croats lose
interest in current Croatian politics since they feel they cannot affect it anymore.” I
conceptualize transnational politics and identity formation further in the following
section.

Transnational Politics
The immigration experience has always been wrought with conflict between “old
loyalties and new realities.” (Portes and Rumbault, 2006:120) Portes and Rumbault
recount how 18th Century Germans tried to “re-create” their nation state via tight-knit
ethnic enclaves situated within the United States. Slovaks, Croats and Polish soon
followed suit. It was not long before political stakeholders realized that they could levy
support from these communities by drawing on their shared status as immigrants to
rally them around “common” political issues. Portes and Rumbault (125-126) write,
“…ethnic markers, originally used to fragment the working class, were redefined by
reactive formation into symbols of pride and rallying points for mass political
participation.”
Large corporations and political movements commonly exploited immigrants for
political gain. However, as they slowly gained footholds in their new communities,
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immigrants leveraged the solidarity of their enclaves. Although frequently manipulated
by politicians and corporate interests, enclave leadership quickly learned the power of
the “ethnic vote” could further their position in the hostland when tendered in
exchange for job opportunities and improved housing conditions. Immigrants also
leveraged their solidarity to further homeland agendas. Migrant communities regularly
lobbied local, state and federal officials to enact policies directly concerning treatment
of their homeland. As Portes and Rumbault (1999: 221) observe, “The stronger these
communities became, the stronger their influence on home country politics.”
Transnational political space appears to be increasingly complex. In short, we
know that migrants’ affiliations continue to develop after they cross national borders,
and we speculate that they develop influential political affiliations in more than one
community. Baubock (2003: 705) writes, “…political institutions and practices that
transcend the borders of independent states are transnational if they involve
simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities.”
Political action becomes transnational when it transcends national borders in either
action or effect.

As Portes and Rumbaut write, (2006: 131) “In many cases, the

magnitude, duration, and impact of migration are so strong that migrant social networks
mature into transnational social fields spanning the sending and receiving
country...[T]hose who live within transnational social fields are exposed to a set of social
expectations, cultural values, and patterns of interaction that are shaped by more than
one political system.”

31

As such, transnational political action is multi-level. (Smith, M.P. 1994, cited in
Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). It occurs in local and distant milieus. Actions may be the
collective efforts of international organizations and multinational corporations or they
may be “survival strategies” of transnational migrants. Moreover, transnational space,
although seemingly supra-national, is better described as local-to-local than as a space
beyond structure. Put simply,
Transnational practices, while connecting collectivities located in more than
one national territory, are embodies in specific social relations established
between specific people, situated in unequivocal localities at historically
determined times...While transnational practices extend beyond two or
more national territories, they are built within the confines of specific social,
economic and political relations which are bound together with perceived
shared interests and meanings. (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998:11-13)
Goldring elaborates further, “…transnational social fields, and localities of origin
in particular, provide a special context in which people can improve their social position,
and perhaps their power, make claims about their changing status and have it
appropriately valorized, and also participate in changing their place of origin so that it
becomes more consistent with their changing expectations and statuses…” (Goldring,
1998: 167) this has been shown to lend leverage to leaders who are able to succeed in a
transnational space more so than the community of origin. In Goldring’s argument, this
is especially salient for Mexican immigrants who strive to build a common Mexican
political identity from the foreground of the United States, absent the constraints of
Mexican authority.
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Transnational political structures legitimize themselves by basing connections on
shared meanings, efforts to achieve social and political equality, and various processes
that may be considered the “political democratization” of transnational space.
(Guranizo and Smith, 1998) As is the dual nature of transnationalism, transmigrants’
political identity becomes at once “free formed and socially determined.” (Guarnizo
and Smith, 1998, 20)

Shapiro (1990) observes that in this “post-modern polity”

migrants redefine their identity with every movement, and every introduction to new
structures and spaces.
These factors shape the political identity of the transnational communities and
diasporas. (See Rouse: 1991, Safran: 1991, Clifford: 1994, etc.) Clifford (1994: 304)
explains this difference, “Diasporas usually pre-suppose longer distances and a
separation more like exile: a constitutive taboo on return, or its postponement to a
remote future.

Diasporas also connect multiple communities of a dispersed

population.” This affects the mode and intensity of the diaspora’s political engagement.
Appadurai (1995) writes, “They also involve various rather puzzling new forms of linkage
between diasporic nationalism, delocalized political communications and revitalized
political commitments at both ends of the diasporic process.” Clifford summaries this
as, “Diaspora cultures thus mediate, in a lived tension, the experiences of separation
and entanglement, of living here and remembering/desiring another place.”
Thus, the strings tying transnational communities and diasporas to two
communities are drawn taut, and we know that this has some impact on their sphere of
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action and influence. How does this affect their political engagement, specifically?
What other factors influence political identity formation and resultant action? I review
these influences in the forthcoming section.

The Role of the State
The sending and receiving states are paramount in determining the degree to
which migrants maintain transnational ties and forge transnational communities. Faist
(2000) writes, “Transnationalism calls attention to the cultural and political projects of
nation-states as they vie for hegemony in relations with other nation-states, with their
citizens and ‘aliens.’” It is challenging, and in some instances undesirable, for migrants
to break from the state with which they associate their language, culture and personal
history. This is even more so the case when transnational activity is sanctioned by the
state directly. Drainville (1995, repeated in Drainville 1998) observes,
It appears…that political transformation in the world economy…relies both
on the confinement of political and social relationships to the space of
national social formations, and on the capacity of states to structure political
participation…[International organizations and states have] in effect built a
wall around the space [they] are attempting to manage

Homeland/hostland policies determine migrants’ array of options to some degree,
and thus, migrants’ ability to become “incorporated” as full citizens in either locale.
(Guarnizo and Smith, 1998, Smith, R., 1998, Ong, 1999). These structural influences
hold broad implications for migrants’ perception of their place both within and between
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state structures.

Baubock and Rundell (1998:21) summarize it simply, “From the

migrants’ perspective, states come in and out of their lives.”
According to Baubock (2005), there are several reasons states allow expatriate
political participation including, maintaining influence via old political ties, the need for
financial remittances and foreign investorship (see also in Baubock, 2003 and Itzigsohn,
2000), ethnic nationalism, and at times, some specific motivation by a political party or
interest sector. Guarnizo and Smith suggest some sending states maintain tangible ties
via “transnational grassroots movements” that foster transnational projects (as initially
brought to light by Smith, M.P., 1994) and often launch efforts to reincorporate
departed citizens.
Transnational practice is thus not only a result of structural processes and
mobility, but sometimes a result of strategic nation-building. Glick Schiller and Fouron
(1998: 132) write, “Nation-building is therefore identified as a set of historical and
affective processes that link disparate and/or heterogeneous populations together and
forge their loyalty to and identity with a central government apparatus and institutional
structure.” This is most evident when migration occurs after conflict or state collapse,
as is the case with Bosnian and Kosovar diasporas. Baubock (2003: 712) describes this
influence on migrant political mobilization, particularly diasporas:
Nation-building processes in the homeland also go a long way towards
accounting for variations in transnational political activities between
migrant groups of different origins that otherwise show similar pattern of
immigration and settlement. While transnational political practices in most
cases will be limited to the first generation of immigrants, diasporic
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identities can persist over generations among descendants of nations
fighting for independence and international recognition. They can
sometimes even be reactivated among groups that originally emigrated as
labor migrants.

States drive nation-building most notably by institutionalizing financial
remittances from departed citizens. According to the 2002 United Nations International
Migration Report, some states rely on migrant remittances sent back to the home
country as a major source of foreign exchange earnings and an important addition to
gross domestic product. The World Bank estimates that remittances to developing
countries topped $251 billion dollars in 2007. I abbreviate the World Bank’s remittance
flow data table in Table One.
Table 1 - Remittance Flows to Developing Countries, 2002-2007 ($ billions)
INFLOWS

2003

2004 2005 2006 2007

Developing countries
East Asia and Pacific
Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and Caribbean
Middle-East and North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa

143
35
16
35
20
30
6

163
39
23
42
23
29
8

194
47
32
48
24
33
10

226
53
39
57
27
40
11

251
59
47
61
29
44
12

World

206

234

266

303

337

Source: Ratha, D., S. Mohapatra, et al. (2008). Remittance flows to developing countries, 2002-2007 ($
billion). Revision to Remittance Trends, The World Bank.

States also encourage political action by adopting citizenship policies that are
amicable to transnational practice. Sending and receiving states overtly encourage
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transnational political practice when they allow migrants to maintain homeland
citizenship regardless of their citizenship status in their receiving communities. In this
way, the state actually becomes involved in the transnational space (Glick Schiller et al
1994). Some (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998) suggest that enacting dual citizenship policies
inhibits migrants’ full assimilation into their receiving community – a policy byproduct
that maybe unintentional or strategic, depending on the motivations of the sending
state. As Portes and Rumbaut (2006: 18) put it, “….the web of transactions between
sending areas and their expatriate communities take over as engines of the movement.”
Some scholars focus on this political duality as a barrier to “properly” enacting
citizenship, one that “may result in new geographies in the dynamics and distribution of
rights and identities, and patterns of exclusion and inclusion,” (Castles 1999; Soysal
2000). Portes and Rumbault (2006: 120) regard U.S. immigrants specifically as being
political.

They write, “Depending on the variable geometry of places of origin and

destination, immigrant communities may be passionately committed to political causes
back home, either in support of or opposition to the existing regime. They may see
themselves as representatives of their nation-state abroad, or they may turn away from
all things past and concentrate on building a new life in America.”
From the vantage point of the receiving state, immigrants’ entry into the political
milieu is typically delayed, if it ever occurs. Many immigrants are so preoccupied with
finding work, housing and language assistance that establishing one’s self as a political
actor is simply unfeasible. Early incorporation typically occurs when some exceptional
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circumstance is present. In situations where immigrants arrive in their receiving state
with a high degree or education, or are barred from ever returning to their homeland,
we observe a higher degree of political awareness and agility. (Portes and Rumbault,
2006) The receiving state’s policies “…can accelerate social integration and economic
mobility, or it can perpetuate social dependence and economic marginalization.”
(Portes and Rumbault, 2006: 93) Portes and Rumbault identify three potential state
dispositions in this regard: “exclusion, passive acceptance, or active encouragement.”
Migrants affected by structural economic changes typically leverage their job
training, business formation and entry into labor markets as the foundation for social
citizenship. Although lacking distinct political entry points, they may integrate “via
secondary political rights” allotted them by trade unions, economic development
programs, and so on (Miller 1987). Post-conflict migrants, however, likely experience
this transnational duality differently than voluntary migrants. Frequently conflict
destroyed, or at the very least distorted, old in- and out-group political ties (Wahlbeck,
1999. See also Kelly, 2003.)
Liebich (2007) lays out these complexities within the scope of the Baltic states
whose “statelessness lasted longer than statehood.” Discontinuous statehood and near
constant political upheaval has broad implications for political identity and membership,
particularly when the citizenship experiences “anguish at the perspective of the
disappearance of one’s own people and country.” (Bibo 1991 [1946]: 13-69), also see
Liebich) Throughout the Eastern European and Balkan states the concept of citizenship
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and political boundary is so ambiguous that migrants opportunity structures are
constantly changing. Some Baltic states allow citizens to maintain citizenship by birth
forever, but some withdraw legal citizenship once the resident departs. Hungary and
Slovakia, for example, allow “plural citizenship” out of concern for their diasporas.
Liebich (2007: 20) summarizes the state of citizenship policy in Eastern European
countries,
…[E]migré pressure in favour of plural citizenship is becoming stronger than
ever. First, as a consequence of the fall of communism, these countries
have reconciled themselves with their historical émigré communities, just as
these communities abroad have reconciled themselves with their countries
of origin. Second, these countries are producing a significant new wave of
emigration.
Guarnizo suggests that immigrants who have obtained U.S. citizenship are less
likely to remain involved in the politics of the homeland. He argues, “Becoming a U.S.
citizen should act as a ‘natural barrier’ to the continuation of political transnationalism.”
(Guarnizo et al, 2003: 1216). Guranizo also points to studies suggesting a correlation
between a higher degree of educational attainment and a greater propensity for
migrant’s political engagement in the receiving community. Pickus (1998), for example,
expounds upon the more global literature depicting education as an influence on
political participation (Lipset 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Olsen 1980; Tarrow 1998),
suggesting that educated immigrants are actually likely to shift their energy (and in
some cases, more material resources) to the political domain of their new home. Within
this reallocation, migrants affect change through local development projects, social
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associations and active political involvement, which may include financial investment in
a cause or initiative (Guarnizo et al, 2003).

Summary of Theoretical Underpinnings
Clearly,
transnationalism.

there

is

significant

literature

evaluating

immigration

and

In general, this literature finds that migrants, regardless of the

circumstances preceding their movement and in at least partial contrast to the past,
have come increasingly to participate in a variety of dual social, political, and economic
processes. Less is known about how migrants’ distinct experiences affect their views
about homeland and hostland politics, and their propensity to participate on or both
political arenas. Moreover, we understand very little regarding how differences in
sending conditions hold political significance for the individual, the community, and the
state.
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CHAPTER THREE – THEORETICAL APPROACH AND
METHODOLOGY
Every migration experience is different, dependent in part on what triggered the
migration flow. People relocate for myriad reasons: war, natural disasters, government
repression, economic change, and the search for new work and educational
opportunities.

The circumstances of departure frequently determine the level of

physical and social capital available to migrants. There may be an existing housing or
employment opportunity, or aid may be available from pre-established family members.
Non-governmental organizations may (NGOs) offer support to immigrants and refugees,
or assist in obtaining citizenship and institutional support. On the other hand, there
may be little by way of assistance with resettlement, language and job training.
We know that migrants can have impetus to exert political influence over
structures in their sending and receiving states simultaneously. But little is known about
migrants’ transnational political action from a comparative perspective.

There is

insufficient insight regarding whether or not immigrants’ conditions of departure
correspond to their political participation habits post-relocation. We know even less
about how different transnational communities and diasporas compare to others with
respect to membership and political participation.
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Research Hypotheses
This study analyzes the political actions of three specific migrant groups. It
differs from other approaches in that I seek specifically to measure (1) difference in the
type and frequency of political participation in the home versus receiving community;
and (2) differences in participation between migrants driven by conflict, and migrants
who relocated due to non-conflict events and circumstances.

I propose two

comparative hypotheses:

H₁ = Conflict-driven migrants engage in political activity more so in their
sending state than in their receiving state.
Null: Conflict driven migrants exhibit no difference in political participation
between their sending and receiving community, or they exhibit less activity in
the sending community than the receiving community.
H₂ = Conflict-driven migrants engage in sending state political activity more so
than non-conflict migrants.
Null: There is no difference in sending state political participation between
conflict and non-conflict migrants.

Toward these aims, I propose the following research questions:
•

Is there a transnational dimension to political participation for conflict and
non-conflict migrants?

•

Is conflict migrants’ political participation actively skewed more toward the
sending state or the receiving state?

•

How is political participation different for conflict-driven migrants versus
migrants driven by other factors?

•

What are the implications of these differences for the political participation
structures in sending and receiving states?
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In the sections that follow, I outline my research approach and methodology,
including a definition of variables.

Defining a Mixed Methods Approach
In gauging whether conflict migrants take stage as transnational political actors, I
rely heavily on the structural foundations in Michel Laguerre’s Diaspora, Politics, and
Globalization. Theoretically, Laguerre relies on globalization as his primary backdrop. I
place this study more precisely within the scope of transnationalism research to better
explain potential dual-state political activity.

I have chosen this theoretical niche

because recent research widely concludes that interstate migration is not merely a
byproduct of globalization. Refugees develop transnational bonds notwithstanding
globalization. (Al-Ali et al, 2001; Moberg, 1996; Shami, 1996)
I diverge from Laguerre methodologically as well. Laguerre examines the Haitian
diaspora migration flow without making any in- or out-group comparisons across a set
of control variables. Conversely, I examine three distinct migration flows from the same
geographic region across a fixed time period. I define a range of dependent and control
variables that allowed me to assess differences within and between the conflict and
non-conflict groups. That said, I employed a mixed qualitative/quantitative research
design, because it allowed for greatest flexibility in data-gathering and analysis within
such a diverse and complex population.
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At its simplest, mixed methodology is defined as, “Data collection that includes
closed-ended items with numerical responses as well as open-ended items on the same
survey.”

(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998)

This allows the researcher to integrate

“qualitative and quantitative data in a way that is mutually reinforcing.” (Creswell and
Plano Clark, 2007) I used a parallel/simultaneous mixed methods design, meaning that I
collected qualitative and quantitative data at the same time, (i.e. using the same
interview protocol), and I presented qualitative and quantitative results in an integrated
fashion.

My wish to rely primarily on “hard” or quantitative results primarily is

tempered by the fact that my sample size was not sufficient to draw full statistical
comparisons in all categories; thus, I use qualitative results to inform the quantitative
analysis and illustrate specific cases. Ulin et al (2004) illustrate this model visually,
which I reproduce in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Mixed Methods Model

QUANTITATIVE

RESULTS

QUALITATIVE
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Population and Sampling
The unit of analysis for this study is the individual participant. I limited criteria
for inclusion to adults over 18 years old who relocated to the United States from
Albania, Bosnia or Kosovo between 1990 and 2009. I focused on this region because all
three groups departed the same region of the world at approximately the same point in
time. Additionally, including these groups allowed me to draw a basis for comparison
considering that the Bosnians and Kosovars were forced migrants and the Albanians
relocated voluntarily.

I excluded illegal immigrants from selection, because: (1) I was

concerned about confidentiality issues that may arise by my documenting interviews;
and (2) illegal immigrants do not have full access to political structures, and therefore, it
would be inappropriate to include them in a survey accounting for political
participation.
Although most desirable, I could not use random sampling for this study. I did
not have access to a large enough research population to employ randomized selection
techniques that would be truly representative of the population residing in the research
area.

This is a common problem when studying such specific populations.

As

Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998:73) suggest. “When you can’t reach the whole
population…. It’s probably more advisable to select your units non-randomly, based on
information you already have about these units.” As such, I used snowball sampling,
meaning that I drafted an initial list of contacts, and requested an interview from those
within study parameters. I interviewed those who consented, and then following the
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interview, I asked them for additional contacts. This approach yielded 86 potential
participants, of whom 77 fell within my selection criteria. In sum, 36 participants
consented to participate in the study. Since all interviews undertaken were 100 percent
complete across all participants, I am able to report a survey response rate of 46.7
percent.3

Definition of Variables and Measures
Transnationalism is exceedingly complex.

So many micro- and macro-

determinants exist that it is very difficult to illuminate all potential influences on
participants’ behavior. I started by defining an independent variable:
x = Conflict Group Assignment
I assigned participants to conflict/non-conflict groups based on two conditions:
(1) known presence of conflict in the sending state at the time of the participants’
departure; and (2) the participants’ indication that conflict was the primary reason they
departed the home state. If the respondents expressly indicated that they left due to
conflict, then I assigned them to the conflict group.4 Over 66 percent of participants
experienced the presence of conflict in their country of origin, while 33.3 percent did
not.

Based on their responses, all members assigned to the conflict group were

3

This rate was calculated according to American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR)
standards for in-person household interviews. http://www.aapor.org/Response_Rates_An_Overview.htm
4

This information was gathered using questions 22 and 23 from the interview questionnaire, which I
include in Appendix c.
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Bosnian and Kosovar, while all non-conflict group members were Albanians from
Albania.
Open-ended responses emphasized departure conditions.

For example, a 50-

year old Bosnian woman said, “…we left our country because of war…But because of
war, we also had no job, no education, no life. Put in perspective…with two little
children, I really didn’t have much of a choice. We ended up here. That means we
didn’t have a choice. We couldn’t stay [in Bosnia].” A 62-year old Bosnian man
explained also, “As a result of politics before war and the result of war…My decision for
me is that it is better for me to stay away [from Bosnia]. And that is why I came over
here...”
Kosovar participants voiced similar experiences. A 46-year old Kosovar woman
responded, “[I left] because of war. I never thought I’m going to leave my country,
never in my life. I was the one from all my friends who I said I’m never going to leave
[Kosovo].”

Another Kosovar woman, age 24, elaborated further, “It was the war, and

then we found out that our entire property had been destroyed. So we came here – it
was the fastest way to get financially stable and see what we could do, whether to
return or stay here.”
In order to define variables, I first laid out what, in my estimation, were all of the
possibilities for participants’ political participation:
•

Action takes place within receiving state political structures only

•

Action takes place within sending state political structures only
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•

Action occurs within receiving state political framework, but it is centered on
issues relevant to the diaspora or with regard to receiving state policy toward
the sending state.

•

Action involves any combination of the above

•

Participant does not act within in any political structure.

Using these assumptions, I turned then to define a set of dependent variables.
These are summarized in Table X.
Table 2 - Definition of Dependent Variables
Dependent
Name
Variable
y
US Citizen
y₁
Sending State Citizen
y₂
Political Issue of Import
y₃

Political Activity Pre/Post-Migration

y₄

Political Activity in US
and Country of Origin

y₅

Political Issues Most
Important

y₆

U.S. Political Party

y₇

Country of Origin
Political Party

y₈

Contributes Money to
U.S. Political Entity

Definition

Points Possible

Current U.S. Citizen
Valid citizenship in sending state
There is at least one political issue
of importance to the participant.
Participants indicate if they were
more politically active before or
after migration.
Participants indicate whether they
are more politically active in the
sending or receiving state.
Participants indicate whether
sending or receiving state political
issues are most important to
them.
Any U.S. political party affiliation,
not limited to any specific set of
parties
Any sending state political party
affiliation, not limited to any
specific set of parties
Frequency of monetary political
contributions to U.S. political
parties and/or candidates

None
None
None
None

0-1 per locale

0-1 per locale

0-1

0-1

0-4
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y₉

y₁₀

Contributes Money to
Country of Origin
Political Entity
Voted in U.S. Election

y₁₁

Voted in Country of
Origin Election

y₁₂

Influence Political
Opinions in United
States (scored from a
list of possible methods)
Influence Political
Opinions in Country of
Origin (scored from a
list of possible methods)
Gather Information
about U.S. Politics
(scored from a list of
information types)
Gather Information
about Country of Origin
Politics (scored from a
list of information
types)
U.S. Political
Participation Score

y₁₃

y₁₄

y₁₅

y₁₆

y₁₇

Sending State Political
Participation Score

Frequency of monetary political
contributions to sending state
political parties and/or candidates
Voted in one or more U.S.
elections
Voted in one or more sending
state elections since migration to
the United States
Number of methods used to
influence political opinions of
others living in the United States

0-1
0-1

0-6

Number of methods used to
influence political opinions of
others living in the sending state

0-6

Number of sources consulted for
information about U.S. politics

0-4

Number of sources consulted for
information about sending state
politics

0-4

Cumulative numeric score on all
dependent variables pertaining to
U.S. participation
Cumulative numeric score on all
dependent variables pertaining to
country of origin participation

0-20

I identified as many valid control variables as possible. These included
•
•
•
•
•
•

0-4

Gender
Sending State
Ethnicity
Length of Time US Citizen (in years)
U.S. Immigration Status at Arrival
Remittances to Family/Friends (in frequency per year)

0-20
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Remittances to Projects (in frequency per year)
Considers Repatriation
Parents/Siblings/Friends/Children Residing in Receiving State
Parents/Siblings/Friends/Children Residing in Sending State
Religion
Highest Level of Education Obtained
English Ability at Migration
Current Employment Status
Current Salary
Age at Interview
Age at Migration
Marital Status

I started out with a slightly longer list of control variables, but in analyzing the data, I
omitted several due to various problems. Specifically, I did not feel comfortable using
the data I gathered for “Length of Time to Obtain Citizenship.” Many of the participants
could not remember with accuracy how long the process took, especially in light of the
five-year Permanent Resident requirement. Some participants factored that period into
their estimate, and some did not. So, I disregarded the variable.
I also observed inconsistency in measuring voting behaviors. I had originally set
up the questions to gather the number of local, state and federal elections for which
each participant had cast a vote. But a significant number of participants could not
recall with certainty. Instead, I measured whether or not the person had ever voted in
an election in the sending and receiving states since the time of migration.
Although I was able to gather participants’ current “Employment Status” and
“Annual Income,” I decided not to use the data I gathered for their employment status
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and income prior to leaving their home country. For one, the conflict participants had
experienced so much displacement that few of them were employed at the time of
departure, although most of them had been employed all of their lives. Since I had
asked for income within an ordinal scale, every participant reported an annual income
under $25,000 USD. I asked participants for more specific estimates of income, but they
were essentially trying to calculate an income based on historical exchange rates to
USD, and it seemed very unreliable. Additionally, since there was so much economic
strain in Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo during the mid-1990s, it was almost impossible to
understand what income would mean as far as socioeconomic status or purchasing
power.
Other variables proved to be insufficient controls, because nearly the entire
survey population exhibited the characteristics being measured.

These included

whether the participant’s hometown was urban or rural, whether the participant had
lived in US since migration, and property ownership in the sending state.

Instrumentation
Using my variable set as a guide, I designed an original interview protocol to
survey the population demographically and construct questions to measure political
participation in the sending and receiving states. The protocol contained 57 closed- and
open-ended queries, some of which had additional follow ups and probes. The
interviews ranged in length from 17 minutes to 112 minutes. The interview protocol is
available in its entirety in Appendix A.
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Procedure and Timeframe
The Wayne State University (WSU) Human Investigation Committee (HIC)
Internal Review Board (IRB) approved all of my recruitment materials for distribution.
In working with various community organizations to gather my initial participant contact
list, I found that many Albanians, Bosnians and Kosovars in Metropolitan Detroit speak
English fluently. However, I hired translators to prepare cross-language materials in
Bosnian and Albanian to ensure I did not exclude any consenting participant due to a
language barrier. An initial translator made all of the translations from my English
materials into Albanian and Bosnian. To check validity, I asked a second translator (who
had never seen the English materials) to translate the Albanian and Bosnian materials
back into English. I reviewed these results to ensure the integrity of the questions and
their meaning.
To recruit participants, I first established a base of initial contacts drawn from
university affiliations, student organizations, cultural groups, faith-based organizations
and businesses with distinct affiliations with Albanians, Bosnians and Kosovars. I mailed
(or emailed) each person a cover letter and two recruitment flyers – one written in
English, and one written in participant’s native language. I also left recruitment flyers
and local businesses and libraries, and I distributed some at community meetings where
I felt I might make contact with eligible participants. I include recruitment materials in
Appendix B.

After the letters and flyers were distributed, I followed up with direct
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phone calls and email. I allotted a total of five attempts per eligible contact before
excluding them from my survey population.
Overall, 46.7 percent of the eligible survey pool consented to interview. Once a
participant consented, I scheduled a time and location of their choosing. I stressed that
they should choose a location where they felt comfortable talking that afforded them a
level of privacy. As a result, I interviewed participants everywhere from libraries and
coffee shops to people’s offices and backyards.

I did not present the research

hypotheses to participants prior to interview, because I did not want to bias their
responses. I described the study more generally by saying, “I am conducting a study to
better understand how individuals born outside of the United States view and
participate in politics here and abroad.

I am gathering research information by

interviewing individuals who relocated to Metropolitan Detroit from other countries.”
Before beginning the interview, I presented each participant with an WSU IRBapproved Information Sheet. The IRB stipulated that I use an Information Sheet rather
than a signed Informed Consent form, because they were concerned about my having
identifying information on file for participants who may be illegal immigrants. Please
see the Information Sheet in Appendix C.

To protect participants’ confidentiality

further, I coded every interview protocol with a numeric identifier only, and I did not
keep a listing associating participants’ names with their identification number.
I provided Information Sheets to the participants in English and their native
language, and I reviewed the entire form with them before beginning the interview. I
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offered participants the option of reading from the printed interview protocol as I
interviewed them. I felt that this was an additional safeguard to over-coming any
potential communication barriers, and it also seems to make the participants feel more
at ease in answering question with numerous response options. Two participants
requested that a translator be present at the time of interview, and so I arranged for the
translator to assist. All of the other participants preferred to be interviewed in English.
I recorded each interview using a digital audio recorder, and I transcribed the
audio recordings into written transcripts coded with the participants’ assigned
identification number. I reviewed each transcript for accuracy. I then entered coded
closed-ended quantitative responses into an SPSS 18.0 dataset. I cleaned the data and
reviewed it for accuracy. As a final quality measure, an assistant read all of the closedended responses and confirmed their accurate entry into the dataset. I reviewed each
transcript a second time to highlight qualitative results selected for inclusion in the
analysis.

I selected qualitative responses for inclusion based on their clarity,

completeness and relevance. Overall, the response had to be audibly understandable.
The participant had to provide a complete answer to the question at hand. Finally,
responses had to be relevant, regardless of whether or not they lent support to the
hypotheses. I excluded all small talk and peripheral conversation from the transcripts.

Data Analysis Plan
I examined each hypothesis in its own context. Hypothesis 1 called for withingroup comparisons, and Hypothesis 2 called for between-groups comparisons. To start,

54

I compiled frequency distributions for all variables. For Hypothesis 1 tests, I limited
cases to only those participants in the conflict group. I then cross-tabulated the data to
determine which factors in addition to conflict/non-conflict group status potentially
influenced my dependent variables. Where associations were evident, I conducted
appropriate correlation tests and interpreted results. Since I was dealing with almost
entirely nominal-level variables, I used Pearson’s Chi Square and proportional reduction
in error (PRE) measures such as Lambda and Cramer’s V. Where tables were 2x2, I
reported the Chi Square statistic, and where they were greater, I reported the Lambda
and Cramer’s V.
I tabulated political participation scores for every participant. I assigned each
survey response measuring a dependent variable a total number of possible points with
higher points indicating a higher magnitude of participation in that particular political
activity. I totaled all points to create each participant’s specific political participation
score. The highest possible cumulative score was 20 points for sending state activity
and 20 points for receiving state activity. For Hypothesis 1, I compared the two scores
to determine whether each conflict participant engaged in more in sending or receiving
state activity, and I measured associations between control variables and mean
participation scores. For Hypothesis 2, I compared scores between the conflict and nonconflict group and then engaged in further analysis.
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Validity
Did I measure what I intended to measure? Are my measures appropriate
indicators of the concepts I put forth? Tashakkoir and Teddlie (1998:67) define internal
validity simply as, “…the degree to which we can trust the conclusions/inferences of the
researcher regarding the “causal” relationship between variable/events.” I worked to
assure internal validity in several ways. For the quantitative analysis, I included a range
of controls for extraneous variables, and I used appropriate statistical measures to
isolate and explain their effects on the dependent variables. I also designed the study to
require both within- and between- groups comparisons so that I could better illuminate
behavioral patterns.
Throughout the qualitative analysis, I applied consistent meaning to questions
and terms both during of the interviews and in my explanation of results. I worked to
ensure that my interpretation was true to the participants’ intended responses. I
accomplished this mainly by keeping my audio recordings and transcripts closely tied to
the interview questionnaire to ensure all responses were kept within context. I also
examined each participant’s open-ended responses in conjunction with their closedended responses to ensure that results were consistent and note any behavior that
seemed out of step with those reported by the participant throughout the broader
interview. As Tashakkori and Teddlie (198, 88) put it, I was “comparing individuals to
themselves.”
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Because I had to forego random sampling for a snowball sampling approach, the
biggest threat to internal validity is selection bias. As with any participation study,
results may be jeopardized by those pre-dispositioned to participate in a study to begin
with. Although selection bias may exist, nevertheless, the narrow selection criteria
yielded a distinct and important subset of people. Although I tried to control for as
many variables as possible, there are possible extraneous effects from other factors.
Neighborhood effects, pre-existing interest in politics, connections to specific political
issues, etc.

Methodological Challenges
Mahler (1998: 91) writes, “…transnationalism should not be expected to produce
even, linear or neat patterns.

Indeed, it is in the ambiguous and seemingly

contradictory findings that scholars are most likely to broaden their understanding of
transnationalism.”

Consider the challenges presented in appropriately observing

modern immigration phenomena. For one, individuals experience a great many things
leading up to and during migration, which breed varying levels of personal and social
capital. Some immigrants arrive with nothing. Others arrive with substantial financial
and social means. As Guarnizo and Smith (1998) point out, there are disparate rates of
access (social, political, economic and otherwise) since migratory groups are themselves
heterogeneous. Migratory populations display varied educational, professional, and
linguistic capabilities. As such, it would be imprudent to suggest that all migrants have
the same access to incorporation in sending and receiving states’ structures.
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Throughout the analyses, the greatest problems were attributable to three main
factors: (1) small sample size, and (2) extensive use of nominal-level variables, and (3)
lack of significant variation between many responses. These factors significantly
challenged my ability to report statistics with a degree of confidence. Specifically, Chi
Square assumes that there are at least five cells present per frequency. Few of my
frequency distributions fulfilled this assumption, and so I caveat those tests with the
note that they are significantly less powerful than they would be with a much larger
dataset.
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CHAPTER FOUR – RESEARCH POPULATION
As acknowledged, transnational political participation is not new. However, we
do not know enough about the distinct transnational political habits of different groups
and what factors shape them. To date, research has lent most attention to studying
non-conflict migrants’ as actors in home- and hostland political structures. We know
something of “forced” migration and its effects, but existing data and studies are not
abundant. In particular, the literature amply conceptualizes “diaspora,” and we have
some understanding of how diasporas form coalitions and exert influence on the politics
of their sending and receiving communities. But how does this compare to the habits of
non-diasporic groups -- groups for whom conflict was not a factor in migration? Does
having been forced to leave the homeland shape a person’s experience more or less so
than voluntary departure? It remains unclear also what matters most in determining
where migrants will associate their political identity and subsequent loyalties, more
generally.
In Chapter 4, I first describe the total research population demographically.
Then I present political participation statistics for the group over to demonstrate a
baseline, and I juxtapose this data with available statistics regarding the non-immigrant
U.S. population as well as the broader population of U.S. immigrants. I conclude with a
summary of pertinent results and a brief review of my hypotheses and research
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questions. In Chapter 5, I present findings specific to Hypothesis 1, and I review
Hypothesis 2 in Chapter 6.

Population Demographics
Approximately 42 percent of the research population was male, and 52.8
percent was female. Thirty-three percent were born in Albania, 22.2 percent in Kosovo,
and 44.4 percent in Bosnia. Nearly 87 percent of respondents reported bring from an
urban center, 5.6percent were from rural areas and 7.3 percent indicated their
hometown was suburban. Among all participants, 41.7 percent were married currently,
and 58.3 percent indicated their marital status as “single.” At the time of interview,
participants’ ranged from 20 years old to 69 years old. The median age was 28.5, which
is younger than the U.S. foreign-born population overall. According to the U.S. Census
Bureau, the median age for the total U.S. population is 36.7, and the foreign-born
population has a median age of 40.2. Based on participants’ birth year and the year
they reported arriving in the United States, I calculated also an “Age at Migration.” See
Table 3 and Table 4 for precise age distribution on both indicators.
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Table 3 – Participant Age at Interview
Age at
Interview (in
years)

Frequency

Percent

18-24

12

33.3

25-34

11

30.6

35-44

4

11.1

45-54

6

16.7

55-64

2

5.6

65+

1

2.8

Total

36

100.0

Table 4 – Participant Age at Migration
Age (in years)
Under 11
11-17
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Total

Frequency
4
15
3
7
5
2
0
36

Percent
11.1
41.7
8.3
19.4
13.9
5.6
0
100.0

I asked participants to indicate their religious affiliation, if any. Everyone fell into
one of three groups: 47.2 percent were Muslim, 27.8 percent indicated No Religion, and
25.0 percent were Christian. Within the context of the survey, “Muslim” contained all
denominations and sects of Islam. In the survey questionnaire, I described “Christian”
as containing the following denominations:

Protestant, Catholic, Roman Catholic,
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Greek, Orthodox, and Mormon. Participants who self-identified as having “no religion”
were agnostic, atheist, or simply indicated “no religion.”
Participants indicated the level of education achieved in their home country as
well as in the United States. I present also the highest level of educational attainment,
overall.

As Table 5 illustrates, all participants had attained some level of college

education at the time of interview.

This is significantly higher than educational

attainment for the general U.S. native-born populations. In Table 6, I use data from the
U.S. Census Bureau’s 2008 Current population survey to illustrate comparative
educational achievement across the three populations.5
Table 5 - Participant Level of Education

Education Level
None
Elementary School
Middle School
High School
One Year of College
Two Years of College
Three Years of College
Four Years of College
Five or More Years of
College
Course/Cert Program
Total
5

Education in Country
of Origin
Percent Frequency
2.8
1
27.8
10
16.7
6
13.9
5
5.6
2
8.3
3

Highest Overall Level
of Education
Percent Frequency Percent Frequency
13.9
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.8
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
11.1
4
8.3
3
16.7
6
22.2
8

0
16.7

0
6

11.1
16.7

4
6

11.1
30.5

4
11

8.3

3

19.4

7

27.7

10

0
100

0
36

8.3
100

3
36

0
100

0
36

Education in US

U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, "Foreign-born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics in
2008"
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Table 6 - Participant Education Level Compared to U.S. Foreign-Born and Native
Education Level

Study
Population

Less than a high school diploma
High school graduates, no college
Some college or associate degree
Bachelor’s degree or higher

0
0
41.6
58.2

U.S. Foreign
Born
Population
26.4
25.2
16.7
31.7

U.S. Native
Born
Population
5.8
29.7
30.0
34.6

Participants provided their current and former employment status. Notably, just
half of the population was not of working age at migration. Table 7 depicts employment
status.
Table 7 - Participant Employment Status Pre- and Post-Migration
Employment Status in Country of Origin Employment Status in US
Percent
Frequency
Percent Frequency
Working
30.6
11
80.6
29
Looking for Work 8.3
3
8.3
3
Keeping House
2.8
1
0
0
Going to School
8.3
3
8.3
3
Retired
0
0
2.8
1
Not of Working Age 50
18
0
0
Total
100
36
100
36
Considering the economic climate at the time this research was undertaken, the
employment rate among participants is very high. At the time of interview, the United
States endured an economic recession that had far-reaching consequences for state and
local unemployment rates. At the end of 2009, the national unemployment rate was
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10.0 percent. In Michigan unemployment rates levied from 12.4 percent-15.6 percent,
and in the Detroit metropolitan area, they swung between 13percent and 17.7 percent.6
Participants provided their annual income before and after migration. Due to
the turbulent economic conditions and variable currency value within Albania, Kosova
and Bosnia during the early- to mid-1990s, it is not possible to calculate equivalent
income ranges in USD. Conflict had also dislocated people within their country of origin,
and in many cases, had forced people from their jobs. In summary, all participants
either were unemployed or earning under $25,000 USD before moving to the United
States. Additionally, the U.S. Census Bureau has not updated U.S. foreign-born income
statistics since 1999. Given incredible changes both within the foreign born population
and in the U.S. economy over the last decade, comparing 1999 income to 2009 income
levels is not reliable. Instead, Table 8 provides participants’ income ranges at the time
of interview compared to income ranges for the total U.S. population.7

6

Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employment status of the foreign-born and native-born populations by
selected characteristics, 2007-08 annual averages” http://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.t01.htm

7

U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement, “Selected
Characteristics of People 15 Years Old and Over by Total Money Income in 2008, Work Experience in
2008, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Sex.”
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032009/perinc/new01_001.htm
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Table 8 - Participant Income Compared to General U.S. Population
Study
Population
Percent
No income
13.9
Less than $25,000 30.6
$25,000-$35,000 8.3
$35,000-$45,000 11.1
$45,000-$55,000 11.1
$55,000-$65,000 8.3
Over $65,000
5.6
Not of Working Age 0
Refuse to Answer 0
Total
100

U.S.
Population
Percent
47.4
13.7
10.6
8.0
5.22
15.1
n/a
n/a
100.0

Migration and Citizenship
Participants described their migration and citizenship experiences. At the time
of interview, all participants had resided in the United States since initial arrival.
Approximately 33 percent spoke English fluently upon arrival, and 66.7 percent did not.
In order to assess participant’s Immigration Status at the time of entry into the United
States, I provided closed-ended response options using terms defined by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)8.
Options included:
Permanent Resident – A permanent resident is not a citizen, but resides
legally in the United States. Permanent residents are commonly referred
to as “Green Card Holders.”
Without Papers – I defined “without papers” to mean that the individual
had no legally recognized immigration or citizenship status upon arrival in
the United States.
8

http://www.uscis.gov, accessed January 23, 2010.
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Visa – A U.S. visa allows an individual entry and temporary stay in the
United States under a certain status. These statuses include: temporary
worker, student or visitor.
Asylee/Refugee – An individual who is “unable or unwilling” to return to
her or his home country out of fear of persecution or harm. According to
USCIS, persecution must be founded on “race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Asylees
must reside in the United States at the time of application for asylum,
whereas refugees typically are outside of the United States at application.
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) – Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
provides a legislative basis for individuals seeking temporary refuge in the
United States due to armed conflict, environmental disaster, or some
other extenuating circumstance occurring in the home country.

I provided also an option for participants to specify another status if there’s was
not listed, or simply indicate that they did not know what immigration status. I
summarize results in Table 9.
Table 9 - Participant Immigration Status at Arrival in U.S.
Status
Permanent Resident
Without Papers
Tourist Visa
Asylee or Refugee
Temporary Protected Immigrant

Percent
33.3
5.6
2.8
50.0
2.8

Frequency
12
2
1
18
1

Other
Don't Know
Total

2.8
2.8
100.0

1
1
36

In order to become a naturalized U.S. citizen, an individual must reside within
the United States for at least five years. The residency requirement may be lessened if
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the individual applying for citizenship is married to (and resides with) a U.S. citizen for a
minimum of three years. Within the study population, 8.3 percent of participants were
not yet eligible to obtain U.S. citizenship. However, all of them had initiated the
citizenship process and intended to become naturalized.

Within the remaining

population eligible for citizenship, 90.9 percent of participants were U.S. citizens at the
time of interview, and 9.1 percent were not. This is more than double the rate of
naturalization than that for the total U.S. foreign-born population. According to the
2008 American Community Survey (ACS), 43 percent the foreign born living in the
United States were naturalized citizens.9
Over half of the research population (52.8 percent) had been U.S. citizens for
between five and ten years. Another 30.6 percent had been U.S. citizens for less than
five years. The U.S. Government allows dual citizenship, and becoming naturalized does
not require that an individual surrender citizenship status in their home country.
However, home country citizenship may be forfeited if (a) the country of origin has laws
specifically prohibiting dual citizenship, and (b) a U.S. immigrants revokes their home
country citizenship formally. A dual citizen is subject to the laws of both countries. As
such, some immigrants choose to revoke their homeland citizenship so they are not
liable for taxes or military responsibilities in a country in which they no longer reside.
Nearly 70 percent (69.4 percent) of the research population maintained dual citizenship

9

U.S. Census Bureau, 2008 American Community Survey, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/ [Accessed
January 27, 2010).
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between the U.S. and their country of origin. Just over 19 percent did not, and 11.1
percent did not know whether or not they had dual citizenship.
Overall, 66.7 percent of participants had lived in the United States for over ten
years, 25 percent for five to ten years, and 8.3 percent for less than five years. Of those
participants were U.S. citizens at the time of interview, 2.8 percent had more than ten
years between their arrival in the United States and citizenship, 75 percent had five to
ten years, and 5.6 percent had less than five years.
I asked participants to choose a primary and secondary reason for relocating
from a list of closed-ended responses. Specifically, I posed the question, “If you had to
pick the statement that most fits your PRIMARY reason for relocating to the United
States, which of these categories best describes the PRIMARY reason why you came to
the United States? Please choose only one response.” Response choices included: to
find work, to reunite with family, to get an education, to get a “better life” overall, fled
from conflict, fled political persecution, and fled religious persecution.

Participants

could also specify a response of “other” if they felt their answer was not listed. I
followed up by asking, “Using the same series of statements, what (if any) would be the
next best statement to describe what most influenced you to move to the United
States? Please choose only one response.” Table 10 includes both response sets.
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Table 10 - Participant Reason for Relocation to U.S.

Reason for Relocating
To find work
Reunite with family
Get an education
Get a "better life" overall
Fled conflict
Fled political persecution
Fled religious persecution
No Response

Primary Reason
Percent
Frequency
2.8
1
2.8
1
19.4
7
38.9
14
25.0
9
11.1
4
0
0
0
0

Secondary Reason
Percent
Frequency
2.8
1
8.3
3
22.2
8
25.0
9
13.9
5
2.8
1
5.6
2
19.4
7

Totals

100

100

36

36

In order to assign participants to a “conflict” or “non-conflict” group, I created a
variable to indicate “presence of conflict” at the time of departure, basing the response
for each participant on two factors: presence of war in the country of origin at the time
of the participants’ departure and the indication of conflict being present on the part of
the participant in his/her open-ended response to the question, “Can you tell me why
you decided to relocate to the United States?” Based on these responses, 66.7 percent
of participants experienced the presence of conflict in their country of origin, and 33.3
percent did not.
I asked participants whether or not they had received relocation assistance
(monetary, legal or otherwise) from any non-governmental organization when they
migrated from their home country to the United States. Just over 55 percent indicated
that they received some form or organizational support, and 44.4 percent did not.
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Participants who received assistance mentioned the United Nations High Committee on
Refugees (UNHCR), Red Cross, Jewish Family Services and several Lutheran faith-based
organizations as having provided them assistance.
Since I seek ultimately to measure differences in civic and political participation, I
am interested also in learning whether participants interact with organizational
structures outside of their work. I asked participants about these affiliations, and I
considered any interaction with a cultural, social, academic, athletic, professional or
faith-based organization to be an organizational affiliation. As such, 66.7 percent of
participants indicated an organizational tie, and 33.3 percent said they had none.

Interactions with Country of Origin
Participants had varied interactions with the people and systems in their
homeland. Just over 8 percent had never visited their country of origin since relocation,
and 58percent visited fewer than five times. Another 27.8 percent visited the sending
state five to ten times, and 5.6percent visited on more than ten occasions. Just over 80
percent of participants indicated that they or their immediate family (as was the case
with many younger respondents) still owned property in the country of origin, 13.9
percent did not, and 2.8 percent were unsure. Participants’ described their properties
as residential, ranging from small apartments to flats and homes. In some cases, family
members or friends resided in the property. In other cases, the property was rented to
a third party.
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Of those participants who had living parents (91.6 percent in total), 22.7 percent
had parents still living in their country of origin only, while 60.6 percent have parents
living in the United States only. All participants who had children (41.7 percent of the
total population) indicated that their children lived either in the United States or a
European Union country. No one reported that their children resided in the family’s
country of origin.

Twenty-five percent of participants did not have siblings.

Approximately 33 percent of the remaining participants had a sibling (or siblings) living
in their country of origin only, and 59.2 percent had siblings living in the United States
only. Over 7 percent had siblings living in both countries. I asked participants whether
they felt they had more friends residing currently in the United States or their country of
origin. About half (52.8 percent) indicated they have more friends residing in the United
States. But 11.1 percent indicated they had more friends in their country of origin, and
33.3 percent said the number of friends in each location was “about the same.” One
participant (2.8 percent) was unsure. Participants were evenly split when it came to
their opinions on repatriation. Fifty percent said they would consider moving back to
their home country and 50 percent said they would not.
Participants described the frequency with which they send financial remittances
back to family and/or friends in their country of origin to “help out.” Similarly, I asked
participants if they ever send money back to their country of origin to support
“projects.”

I defined projects as “charitable works, development projects, education
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efforts and/or schools, faith-based initiatives, or some other project.”

Table 11

presents remittance results.
Table 11 - Financial Remittance Frequency

Frequency

Family/Friend
Percent Frequency

Project
Percent Frequency

Never
Once only
Every one or two
years
Once per year
More than once per
year
Total

25.0
2.8

9
1

66.7
8.3

24
3

8.3

3

8.3

3

16.7

6

5.6

2

41.7

15

5.6

2

94.4

34

34

34

No Response

5.6

2

2

3

100.0

36

100.0

36

Civic and Political Participation
How does an action or interaction become inherently political or civic-minded?
There are many actions one may take that can be construed as having a civic flavor, but
only a few that are undeniably political. As Putnam (2000) and many other suggest,
voting is an inherently political action taken by private citizens. Generally, political
activities also include political party membership and financial contributions to political
candidates or parties. Individuals may also take avid interest in gathering information
about political issues and causes or go so far as to contact a public official, friend of
family member in an effort to persuade them toward their point of view.
I asked participants to respond to a number of open- and closed-ended
questions measuring the type and frequency of “political” activities in which people

72

engaged.

For each question, I asked specifically about activities undertaken with

respect to both the U.S. and the participants’ country of origin. I asked also about the
sources from which participants gather information about political happenings in the
United States and their home country. Optional responses included: public information
(radio, newspaper, television, websites, etc.), friends and/or family, community
organizations, other (please specify). Participants could also specify, “I do not gather
information about politics in my home country.”
I asked participants generally, “Are there any political issues that are important
to you?” I explained that these could be issues of interest pertaining to U.S. politics,
politics of the home state, or issues that would fall more broadly under the milieu of
world politics” or “current events.” Slightly over 86 percent of participants said yes,
while 11.1 percent said no, and 2.8 percent did not know. I followed up with an openended question seeking to understand the issues of greatest importance to participants.
I elaborate on these responses in the qualitative analysis contained in Chapter 5.
Although exact data for the general U.S. population was not available, it is interesting to
note the 2006 Social Capital Survey conducted by the Roper Center for Public Opinion
research.10 Investigators asked survey respondents, “How interested are you in politics
and national affairs?” Respondents answered as such: 7.9 percent said “not at all,”

10

Social Capital Community Survey, 2006 data collected by Professor Robert D. Putnam of the Saguaro
Seminar Civic Engagement in America, a project of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University and numerous community foundations nation-wide, and made available through the Roper
Center for Public Opinion Research.
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16.7percent said “only slightly interested,” 37.6percent said “somewhat interested,”
and 37.8percent said “very interested.”
I asked participants, “Would you say you were a more politically active person
before or after you migrated to the United States?” I excluded participants who were
children at relocation, which rendered 50percent of the total population eligible to
answer the question. Of this segment, just 8.3percent indicated that they were more
politically active before relocating, while 22.2percent were more active after.

An

additional 5.6percent of participants said they were “about the same” pre- and postmigration, and 13.9percent said they were “never really politically active.”
Next, I asked participants a series of questions intended to gauge political effects
of migration and level of interaction with political structures in the United States versus
the country of origin. To start, I asked participant, “Today, are you more politically
active with regard to U.S. political affairs or the political affairs of your home country?”
I then followed up by asking, “Which political events are more important to you
currently – those of the United States, or those of your home country?” I described
“political events” as “elections, policy change, changes to the political structure or
political parties, etc.” Table 12 contains results.
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Table 12 - Political Activity and Issues Most Important
More Politically Active Political Issues Most Important
Frequency Percent
Frequency
Percent
US
15
41.7
20
55.6
Country of Origin
1
2.8
3
8.3
About the same in both 11
30.6
12
33.3
Not active in either
9
25.0
1
2.8
Total
36
100.0
36
100
The survey questionnaire sought to establish political further political behaviors,
especially those associated with such overt political activities as voting, political
partisanship, and making financial contributions to political causes. I use Table 13 to
describe participants’ voting habits. Participants were asked whether or not they had
voted in an election in the Unites States or their country of origin since relocating to the
United States. In other words, in order to be counted as a “yes,” the participants vote in
either country had to be cast since they have lived in the United States.
Table 13 - Participant Voting Behavior
U.S. Election
Frequency Percent
Not Eligible to Vote 5
13.9
Yes
23
63.9
No
8
22.2
Total
36
100.0

Country of Origin Election
Frequency
Percent
0
0
5
13.9
31
86.1
36
100.0
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This is comparable to general U.S. election voter turnout. The General Social
Survey (GSS) reports that 66.9 percent of survey respondents voted in the 2004 U.S.
Presidential election, while 24.0 percent did not, and 9.1 percent were ineligible.11
Participants provided also their political party affiliations. I asked participants to
provide only those party affiliations that they held at the time of interview and not
previously. Nearly 37 percent claimed no U.S. political party affiliation. The remaining
participants were 50percent Democrats, 5.6 percent Republicans, 8.3 percent
Independent, and 5.6percent “other.” Over 19 percent of participants claimed they
were affiliated with a political party on their home country, and 80.6percent were not.
Another common measure of political engagement is political candidate or party
contributions. The GSS reports that 21.1 percent of their survey respondents had made
a political contribution over the last three to four years to “a political party or candidate
or any other political cause.” The remaining 78.9 percent had not.12 I asked participants
how often they had made financial contributions to political candidates and political
parties since relocating. These could be contributions to a United States entity or an
entity in the country of origin. I present participant responses in Table 14.

11

Davis, James Allan and Smith, Tom W. General social surveys, 1972-2008[machine-readable data file]
/Principal Investigator, James A. Davis; Director and Co-Principal Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal
Investigator, Peter V. Marsden; Sponsored by National Science Foundation. --NORC ed.-- Chicago:
National Opinion Research Center [producer]; Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research,
University of Connecticut [distributor], 2009.

12

Ibid.
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Table 14 - Financial Contribution to Candidates and/or Parties
Candidate or Party in the United Candidate or Party in Country of
States
Origin
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
24
66.7
33
97.1

Never
Once only
Every one or two
years
Once per year
Total

5
6

13.9
16.7

1
2

2.8
5.6

1
36

2.8
100.0

0
36

0
100.0

The GSS also provides statistics on survey respondents’ interactions with public
figures. Approximately 22.3 percent of respondents had “contacted or attempted to
contact a politician or civil servant to express their views” within the last year.13
Another 20.9 percent of respondents indicated having done so in “the more distant
past.” I spoke with study participants about their direct interactions with political
figures by asking, “Since you relocated to the United States, have you contacted any
political figure in the United States to relay your views on some issue?” I described
“political figures” as “elected officials, bureaucrats, federal, state or local leaders, etc.” I
then followed up with the same question, applicable instead to political figures in the
country of origin. Results are shown in Table 15.

13

Ibid.
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Table 15 - Interaction with Political Figures

Never
Once only
Once per year
Every one or two
years
More than once
per year
Total

Contacted US Political Figure
Frequency
Percent
24
66.7

Contacted Political Figure in
Country of Origin
Frequency
Percent
31
86.1

5
2
0

13.9
5.6
0

1
0
1

2.8
0
2.8

5

13.9

3

8.3

36

100.0

36

100.0

The GSS asks, “When you hold as strong opinion about politics, how often do you
try to persuade your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views?”

To

which 12.5 percent of respondents indicated, “often,” and 29.2 percent said,
“sometimes.” Thirty-three percent said, “rarely,” while the remaining 25.3 percent said,
“never.”14
I wanted to measure less structured, more personal mechanisms of political
participation within this research population as well. “Since you relocated to the United
States, have you used any of these means to influence people’s opinions about politics?
In this case, I’m interested in how you’ve communicated with people living in the United
States. Please select all that apply.” Response options included: Letter, Email, Internet
Blog, Phone Call, Boycott some business or product, Other (please specify). I then asked
14

Ibid.
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the same question with regard to influence exerted on individuals living in the
participants’ country of origin. Upon analyzing the results, I found that it was less
important which means of communication an individual was using, as it was how many.
This approach lent a better lens for frequency and intensity of interaction. See results
summarized in Table 16.
Table 16 - Methods Use to Influence Political Opinions
U.S.
Frequency Percent
None
20
55.6
One
7
19.4
Two
4
11.1
Three
2
5.6
Four
1
2.8
Six or more 2
5.6
Total
36
100.0

Country of Origin
Frequency
Percent
23
63.9
7
19.4
5
13.9
1
2.8
0
0
0
0
36
100.0

Now that I’ve described the general demographic and political participation
characteristics of the of the research population, I turn toward examining my
hypotheses and reporting results of the surveys and data analyses. I examine first the
in-group comparison and then draw comparisons between the conflict and non-conflict
groups.
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CHAPTER FIVE – CONFLICT GROUP SENDING AND
RECEVING STATE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
In Hypothesis 1, I posit that conflict migrants participate in politics more in their
sending state than in their receiving state post-resettlement.

Previous research

demonstrates that there is typically a transnational dimension to contemporary
migrants’ economic, political and social spheres.

I suggested that conflict migrants

would participate more in the sending state than the receiving state, for several
reasons. For one, the “suddenness” of departure leaves conflict migrants little time to
accept the emergent distance to family, friends, and property as well as learn the
language and customs of the receiving community. Many conflict migrants seek to stay
engaged or even to repatriate to the homestate.
Research questions related to Hypothesis 1 include:
•
•
•

Is there a transnational dimension to political participation for conflict
migrants?
Are some resettled conflict migrants more likely to participate in sending
state politics post-settlement than others?
What factors influenced conflict migrants’ engagement in the sending versus
receiving state?

Since the second research question is so similar to the hypothesis, I refocused
my efforts toward examining additional questions as well. For instance, do such factors
as property ownership in the home state or frequent return trips to the homestate
influence conflict migrants’ engagement in the sending versus receiving state? Are
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some resettled conflict migrants more likely to participation in sending state politics
than others?
I cross-tabulated all of my dependent variables and control variables, and then
selected the most significant for further correlational testing. These included country of
origin, gender, religion and age at interview. I reference these cross-tabulations and
correlations throughout this chapter to illustrate findings. I conclude that the conflict
group overall participated more in U.S. politics than sending state politics, which was a
null finding. Across all indicators, participants were more engaged politically in the
receiving state than the sending state. I conclude this chapter with a summary of these
indicators, and suggest reasons for the finding.

Sending and Receiving State Activity Comparisons
To start, I asked conflict group participants what “political issues” were
important to them. This question was open-ended and participants could identify issues
pertaining to the sending state, receiving state, world politics or really any area of
interest to them. Over 83 percent identified a political issue of importance to them, and
over 16 percent did not.

Fifty five percent of respondents specified a political issue

related to their sending state. Issues specific to Bosnia and Kosovo include: economic
stability, civil rights, government corruption, state sovereignty and preservation of
democracy.

Remaining participants spoke of war, human rights, U.S. economic

recovery, U.S. health care reform, and U.S. immigration reform. All of the participants
who did not express an issue area of importance to them were women. Over 66
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percent were Bosnian, and 33.3 percent were Kosovar. The responses were spread
evenly across religious affiliations with one participant being Christian, one Muslim and
one having no religion. Just over 33 percent were under 31 and 66 percent were over
31.
In a closed-ended response, I asked participants if they had any interest in U.S.
foreign policy toward their sending state. Over 83 percent said yes, and 16.7 percent
said no. Seventy-five percent of those who said no were Bosnian, and 25 percent were
Kosovar. Seventy five percent were women, and 25 percent were men. Fifty percent
had no religion, 25 percent were Christian and 25 percent were Muslim. There was no
so significant association between variables, as demonstrated by the correlation tests in
Appendix A.
I employed also closed-ended and scaled comparative behavioral measures. In
other words, I included questions asking, “Do you engage in this political behavior in the
United States?” and then “Do you engage in this same political behavior in your sending
state?” Participants selected the number of means by which they gathered political
information about their sending and receiving state.

Possible means of gathering

information included public information sources (such as newspapers and magazines,
Internet resources, television and radio, etc.), friends and family, and community
organizations. Participants could also indicate any methods used that I had not listed,
and I included those responses in the frequency distributions.
distributions in Table 17.

I provide these
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Table 17 - Means Used to Gather Political Information (Conflict Group)
United States Politics
Number of
Means Used
None
One
Two
Three

Sending State Politics

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

1
19
2
2

4.2
79.2
8.3
8.3

2
14
6
2

8.3
58.3
25.0
8.3

Comparatively, 95.8 percent of conflict participants used one or more means to
obtain information about US politics, and 91.6 percent used one or more means to
obtain information about country of origin politics. However, only 16.6 percent use
more than one means to gather information about U.S. politics, while 33.3 percent use
more than one means to gather information about sending state politics.

So, while

slightly more participants gathered information about the receiving state, participants
used slightly more information sources in the sending state than they so in the receiving
state. The only participant who did not gather information about U.S. politics was a
Christian Bosnian woman who was over 31 years old. Both of the participants who did
not gather political information about the sending state were Christian Bosnian women
over 31 years old. I include my correlation tests in Tables X and X (Appendix A) to
illustrate that none of the control variables significantly predicted the number of means
used to gather political information.
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I asked conflict group participants who were legal U.S. citizens (95.8 percent of
the group) whether they had ever voted in a U.S. election.

Eighty-seven percent of

eligible participants had voted in a U.S. election, and 13 percent had not. Non-voters
were 66.7 percent Bosnian and 33.3 percent Kosovar. They were 66.7 percent male,
and 33.3 percent female. Most (66.7 percent) were Muslim, and 33.3 percent were
Christian. Nearly 67 percent were under 31, and 33.3 percent were over 31 years old.
Conversely, 20.8 percent of conflict group participants voted in their sending state since
resettlement, and nearly 80 percent did not. Eighty percent of those who voted in their
home country were Bosnian, and 20 percent were Kosovar. Sixty percent were men,
and 40 percent were women. Sixty percent were Muslim, and 40 percent had no
religion. Forty percent were under 31 and 60 percent were over 31. Correlations
contained in Appendix A indicated no significant associations with control variables.
Over 70 percent of the conflict group affiliated with a U.S. political party. The
majority of participants (62.5 percent) were Democrats, and 8.3 percent were
Independents.

None were Republican.

Over 29 percent had no party affiliation.

Participants without a U.S. political party affiliation were 71.4 percent Bosnian and 28.6
percent were Kosovar. Just over 51 percent were men, and 42.9 percent were women.
Over 71 percent were Muslim, 14.3 percent were Christian and 14.3 percent had no
religion. Nearly 43 percent were under 31 years old, and 57.1 percent were over 31
years old. Twenty one percent affiliated with sending state political parties. Eighty
percent were Bosnian, and 20 percent were Kosovar. Sixty percent were men, and 40
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percent were women. Sixty percent were Muslim, and 40 percent had no religion.
Most (80 percent) were under 31 at the time of interview, and 20 percent were older.
There were no significant relationships between political party affiliation and the control
variables.
I followed the political party affiliation questions with questions about financial
contributions to sending and receiving state political parties and candidates. Over 33
percent of the conflict group had made contributions to U.S. candidate or party at least
once since resettlement, and 66.7 percent had never done so. Those who did not
contribute money were approximately 69 percent Bosnian and 31 percent Kosovar.
Over 62 percent were women, and 37.5 percent were men. Over 56 percent were
Muslim, 25 percent had no religion and 18.8 percent were Christians. Just over 56
percent were under 31, and 43.8 percent were over 31 years old. Only 8.4 percent of
participants had made a financial contribution to a party in the sending state, and 91.7
percent had not. Of those participants that did make a contribution to a sending state
party or candidate, one was from Bosnia and one was from Kosovo. Both were men
under 31 years old who indicated they had no religion. Results in Appendix A reveal no
significant correlations.
Over 79 percent of conflict group participants had never contacted a U.S.
political figure, but the remaining 20.8 percent contacted someone at least once. Over
8 percent contacted an official once per year, and another 8 percent contacted
someone more than once per year. Thos who did contact someone were 80 percent
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Kosovar and 20 percent Bosnian. Sixty percent were women, and 40 percent were men.
Sixty percent had no religion, 20 percent were Christian, and 20 percent were Muslim.
Sixty percent were younger than 31, and 40 percent were older. The relationship
between country of origin and U.S. political contact was significant at x2(3) = .698, p =
.011. As I discuss in-depth in Chapter 6, I believe this association is due, in part, to a
strong connection between Kosovars and their more politically established Albanian
counterparts. The Albanians, having a long generational presence in the Detroit area,
have a significant history of cultural organization and business investment in the area.
As such, they have paved more in-roads with local politicians, and they frequently share
this access with members of the Kosovar population.
The number of participants contacting sending state political figures was
comparable to receiving state contact. Some 83.3 percent of the conflict group never
made contact with a political figure, and over 16 percent contacted someone with
frequency ranging from once only to more than once a year. Seventy five percent of
those who did were Kosovar, and 25 percent were Bosnian. The participants were split
at 50 percent men and 50 percent women. Fifty percent were Muslim, 25 percent were
Christian and 25 percent had no religion. Participants were also evenly split by age with
50 percent being under 31 and 50 percent being older than 31 years. Correlational tests
between controls and sending state political participation were insignificant. These
results are in Tables X and X in Appendix A.
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I asked participants to indicate how many methods they use to “influence other
people’s opinions about politics. Possible choices included email, direct calling, letterwriting, protesting, and boycotting. Participants were allowed to indicate methods mot
listed on the questionnaire as well. Over 37 percent of participants said they tried to
influence the political opinion of someone living in the United States, and 62.5 percent
did not. Those who did were 66.7 percent Bosnian, and 33.3 percent Kosovar. Nearly
67 percent were male, and 33.3 percent were female. Over 44 percent were Muslim,
33.3 percent had no religion, and 22.2 percent were Christian. Nearly 56 percent were
under 31, and 44.4 percent were 31 or older. As shown in Appendix A, none of the
control variables statistically correlated with attempts to influence U.S. political
opinions.
Results for influencing political opinions of people in the sending state were very
similar to those for the receiving state with 66.7 percent never doing so, and 33.3
percent using one or more means of influence. Of those who did try to influence
sending state opinions, 62.5 percent were Bosnian, and 37.5 percent were Kosovar.
Over 63 percent were men, and 37.5 percent were women. Results were spread across
religious affiliation with 37.5 percent being Christian, 37.5 percent having nor religion,
and 25 percent being Muslim. Over 37.5 percent were under 31 years, and 62.5 percent
were over 31 years old.

There were no statistically significant relationships between

variables, demonstrated in Appendix A, Tables X and X.
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When seeking to understand if participants were more or less politically active
after migrating to the United States, I excluded participants who were young children at
the time of resettlement, because they said they felt were too young to be independent
political actors prior to resettlement. This ruled out 45.0 percent of the total group.
Responses for before/after migration were the same with 23.1 percent saying before,
and 23.1 percent saying after. Over 15 percent said they felt they had the same level of
involvement before and after migration, and 38.5 percent said they were never really
active. There were no characteristics distinguishing one response set or another with
the exception of the “was never active” results. Eighty percent of those who said they
were never really active were women, and all of them were Bosnian. They were spread
across religions with 60 percent being Christian, 20 percent Muslim, and 20 percent
having no religion. All of them were over 34 years old. I did not detect any statistically
significant associations.

I asked participants which political events were most important to them – those
of the sending state or those in the receiving state. Nearly 67 percent said U.S. politics
were of greater importance to them. Over 29 percent of respondents said that country
of origin political events had the same importance to them as U.S. political events. Just
one participant (4.2 percent) indicated that country of origin political events were more
important to her. Correlation tests revealed no statistically significant relationships
between controls and dependent variables. Appendix A contains findings.
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I asked participants outright whether they were more politically active in the
sending or receiving state at the time of interview. No one said they were more active
in their sending state than their receiving state. Forty-one percent said they were more
active in U.S. politics, and nearly 38 percent said their activity was “about the same in
both.” Within this subset, 66.7 percent of these participants were Bosnian, and 33.3
percent were Kosovar. Additionally, 66.7 percent were men, and 33.3 percent were
women. Nearly 67 percent were Muslim, 22.2 percent had no religion, and 11.1 percent
were Christian. The findings in Appendix A indicate that none of the control variables
significantly predict importance of political events.

Comparing Conflict Group Political Participation Scores
I calculated a “political participation score” for each participant based on a fixed
number of points per response to questions about political behavior. The lowest
possible score was zero, and the highest was 20. Actual scores for US participation
spread from 2 to 13 points, and the median score was 4.5 with a standard deviation of
2.75. The mean score was 5.29. I provide the spread of all scores in Table 18.
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Table 18 - Conflict Group Mean Political Participation Scores (Receiving State)
Points Frequency Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

2.00

3

12.5

12.5

3.00

5

20.8

33.3

4.00

4

16.7

50.0

5.00

1

4.2

54.2

6.00

4

16.7

70.8

7.00

2

8.3

79.2

8.00

2

8.3

87.5

9.00

2

8.3

95.8

13.00

1

4.2

100.0

Total

24

100.0

Just 37.5 percent of Bosnians scored higher than the median score, compared to
75 percent of Kosovars. Gender scores were almost exactly the inverse of one another.
Just over 36 percent of men scored below the median score, and 63.6 percent scored
higher. Conversely, 61.5 percent of women scored below the median, and 38.5 percent
scored higher. Participants also the exact inverse when it came to age. Nearly 42
percent of participants under 34 percent scored below the median U.S. political
participation score, and 58.3 percent scored higher.

Interestingly, 71.4 percent of

participants citing “no religion” scored above the median, and 28.6 percent scored
below. This compared to 40.0 percent of Christians with higher then median scores, and
47.7 percent of Muslims. In the over 31 age group, 58.3 percent scored below the
median, and 41.7 percent scored above. None of the cross-tabulations between U.S.
political participation score and the control variables were statistically significant.
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Sending state participation scores were lower than receiving state participation
scores. They ranged from spread from 0 to 13 points, with the median score being 3.0.
The mean score was 3.25, and the standard deviation was 2.78. Table 19 contains the
spread of all scores.
Table 19 - Conflict Group Mean Political Participation Scores (Sending State)
Points Frequency Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

.00

2

8.3

8.3

1.00

4

16.7

25.0

2.00

5

20.8

45.8

3.00

4

16.7

62.5

4.00

4

16.7

79.2

5.00

3

12.5

91.7

8.00

1

4.2

95.8

13.00

1

4.2

100.0

Total

24

100.0

As with receiving state participation scores, none of the subsequent crosstabulations for sending state participation were statistically significant. Bosnians and
Kosovars had exactly the same number of participants below and above the median
scores – 62.5 percent of both scored below the median, and 37.5 percent above the
median. Just over 45.5 percent of men scored below the median score, and 54.5
percent scored higher. Conversely, 76.9 percent of women scored below the median,
and 23.1 percent scored higher. Among those under 31 years old, 66.7 percent scored
below the median, and 33.3 percent scored higher. In the over 31 age group, 58.3
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percent scored below the median and 41.7 percent scored above. The distribution for
participants over 31 years old was the same for receiving state participation as it was for
U.S. political participation. Nearly 43 percent of participants citing “no religion” scored
above the median, and 57.1 percent scored below. This compared to 40.0 percent of
Christians with higher then median scores, and 33.3 percent of Muslims. There were no
statistically significant associations between the control and receiving state political
participation scores.

Summary of Results
In assessing the effects of conflict experience on political participation, I
could not reject the null hypothesis. Conflict migrants participated politically more
in their receiving state than their sending state for every indicator analyzed,
including a comparison of overall mean political participation scores. Table X
summarizes results across all political indicators.
Table 20 - Hypothesis 1 Political Indicators Summary
Indicator
Gathered Information about Politics
Voted in Election
Political Party Affiliation
Contributed Money to Political Candidate/Party
Contacted Political Figure
Attempted to Influence Political Opinions
Mean Political Participation Score

Sending
State
92%
21%
21%
8%
16%
33%
3.25

Receiving
State
96%
87%
70%
33%
21%
36%
5.29
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Perhaps the most straightforward conclusion can be drawn simply from the
questions asking participants outright where they allocate more activity and which
events are most important to them. By participants’ own admission, they do not
participate more in their sending state than their receiving state, nor were sending
state politics more important to them. I summarize these results in Table 21.
Table 21 - Self-Identified Sending/Receiving State Activity (Conflict Group)
Indicator
More Politically Active Overall*
Political Issues Most Important

Sending State
0
4%

US
41%
67%

Same
36%
29%

*This distribution does not total 100%, because 23% of participants indicated that they are not politically
active at all in either locale.

Overall results demonstrate that there is a transnational dimension to political
participation for some conflict migrants, but not the majority I had hypothesized.
Qualitative interview responses provided some insight into participation patterns, some
of which was noteworthy. For instance, almost all participants continued to gather
political information about their sending state via Internet news sources, family and
friends residing in the sending state, and community organizations.
Participation in such activities as voting and engaging with political parties was
less common in the sending state than it was in the receiving state. Having gained
additional insight about voting processes from the participants, I was surprised that
even 20 percent had cast a sending state vote. Participants expressed a great deal of
confusion about their sending state citizenship rights the institutional response to their
displacement. There were barriers to accessing information and resources necessary to
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vote in their homeland, and some misunderstanding about eligibility. As one Bosnian
participant said, “No [I did not vote], but I really wanted to. I tried to vote, but could
not.”
Another Bosnian participant described perceptions of sending state Bosnian
woman, 28 corruption as being a possible deterrent to casting a vote, In her town, for
example, she blamed party politics and cronyism for a government shutdown that
occurred in her home city and left many feeling discouraged. She said,
The [United Nations] ambassadors were targeting people living in diaspora,
you know, in the U.S. or anywhere, and they had a really low turnout. I
think that because of the way things worked out [in the home state], a lot of
people were just discouraged. People were telling me, “Why don’t you go
vote?” But I’m thinking if I voted, it wouldn’t have really mattered.
Although contact of political officials was low for both the sending and receiving
state, I observed that all contact with U.S. officials centered around sending state issues,
thus making the action transnational. The only statistically significant relationship was
between contact of U.S. political figures and country of origin. Kosovars exhibited
higher rates of contact with U.S. officials than Bosnians, and they provided examples of
interactions focused on the “Albanian cause” and issues related to Kosovar
independence. Regardless of country of origin, gender, religion or age, all of the
participants who had contacted a U.S. political figure did so to discuss issues relevant to
the sending state. So although the action was initiated within a U.S. political structure,
the interaction was undertaken to produce an outcome in the sending state.
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A 46-year old Kosovar woman explained her involvement in contacting U.S.
political officials to request they intervene in the imprisonment of political prisoners in
Montenegro,
We went many times to Washington DC about Kosova, Albania and
Montenegro. We are very active as a community. They [political prisoners]
been in jail for two years over there, and the reason why they are out is
because we did a lot as a community. We initiate the things through [U.S.]
government, and government react over there, and they are free now…And
we had a lot of community dinners for Wesley Clark and Senator Levin and
all them. David Bonior and all of them, they were there. I went on those
events all the time. My husband actually went and met Hillary Clinton, too.

A 24-yeard old Kosovar woman echoed similar interactions, “I’ve met with Debbie
Stabenow, Carl Levin and [David] Bonior…I’ve attended some of the rallies of Al Gore’s,
when he was running, and I helped out during that time a little bit…It was more for the
Albanian cause.” I conducted an anecdotal interview with a Bosnian man who was not
meet study criteria. He explained also, “I contacted all of them. These issues were
related mostly to the genocide in Bosnia. I got responses – I’m satisfied.”
Nearly as many people attempted to influence sending state political opinions as
there were receiving state political opinions.

Perhaps most interesting was the

pervasive use of Internet-based social networks, email distributions and blogs to shape
sending state opinions. I discuss further the use of technology in shaping transnational
political action in my concluding chapter.

A Bosnian participant in her late-20s

explained her rationale for attempting to influence opinions in her sending state,
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I think – I mean especially when you’ve lived in another country like the
United States that’s so much more organized. It has its negatives of course,
but it’s still a very powerful country for a reason. And I think once you’ve
seen that, and then you move back to Bosnia or any other country, you just
kind of have to get involved because you can’t keep your mouth shut.
Because you’ve learned a lot of things here and just kind of feel like you
have a voice, and you should have a voice. You know, you just don’t want to
be quiet about so many things. So I can see myself getting involved.
Participants who said their political activity was “about the same in both” the
sending and receiving states explained their sense of duality about which political
events were most important to them. A 41-year old Kosovar woman said,

It’s hard because I love my country. Also, I love United States. They are
equally important because I live here, my kids live here, my friends,
everybody. But also in Kosovo, I still have family, I still have friends. So
equally [important], I could say.
A 23 year-old Kosovar woman explained,
I mean I live here. I want to know more about different things here. But I’m
involved also in Kosova politics in different ways…I went to Indiana with the
U.S. Army, and I actually prepared the soldiers [for] when they go back to
Kosova with language, culture…how to use an interpreter, role-playing…This
way, I can help the U.S. and Kosova at the same time.
A female Bosnian participant explained her “about the same” response as well
I think I’m probably more informed about Bosnian politics because I’m
constantly reading the newspapers and watching the news and everything.
But when it comes to involvement in terms of voting and everything, that’s
more here.
Although overall statistical correlations were insignificant, I noted several trends
worthy of discussion. For one, older Bosnian women participated in political structures
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(sending and receiving state) less so than others. Several commented also on the desire
to withdraw from political activity overall. Additionally, participants under 31 years old
participated in sending state political structures more than I anticipated given that in
most cases they had lived in the United States longer than then they lived in their
sending state. I elaborate on gendered transnationalism and generational effects in the
final chapter as well.
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CHAPTER SIX – COMPARING PARTICIPATION BETWEEN
CONFLICT AND NON-CONFLICT GROUPS
In Hypotheses 2, I suggest that conflict-driven migrants will participate in sending
state politics more than non-conflict migrants. I proposed also the following research
questions in relation to Hypothesis 2:
• Is there a transnational dimension to political participation for conflict
migrants and non-conflict migrants?
• Are some conflict migrants more likely than non-conflict migrants to
participate in sending state politics post-settlement?
• What factors influenced non-conflict migrants’ engagement in the
sending versus receiving state?
I suggest that conflict migrants will engage in sending state politics more so than
receiving state politics for several reasons. Primarily, non-conflict migrants typically
have made advance preparations for relocation such as obtaining English language
instruction and lining up housing, educational and employment opportunities. . They
also have more financial capital and pre-established connections to family or social
support networks. Therefore, non-conflict migrants generally arrive in their receiving
community with more social capital than conflict migrants and are better prepared to
engage in assimilation processes in the receiving community. This means they are more
likely than conflict migrants to incorporate politically in the receiving community.
Conflict migrants never intended to leave their home state, so they never had an
opportunity to prepare for relocation emotionally, culturally, financially. This may
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influence them to take greater stake in sending state politics and remain an active
participant in sending state structures after relocation.

Political Indicators
When making comparisons between the conflict group and non-conflict group, I
used the same set of political indicators and I used conflict/non-conflict group
assignment. Just over 83 percent of the conflict group said there were political issues
“of importance to them” compared with 91.7 percent of the non-conflict group. Just
over 83 percent of the conflict group said U.S. foreign policy toward their home country
was important to them, while every participant in the non-conflict group did. Conflict
group status did not predict results. These correlation tables are included in Appendix
B.
Comparatively, 95.8 percent of the conflict group used one or more means to
obtain information about US politics, and 91.7 percent used one or more means.
However, only 16.6 percent of the conflict group used more than one means to gather
information about U.S. politics, while 50 percent of the conflict group used more than
one means to gather information about sending state politics. So, while slightly more
participants gather information about the receiving state, non-conflict participants
engage with more U.S.-based information sources than conflict participants. Table 22
contains frequencies.
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Table 22 - Means Used to Gather Receiving State Political Information (Between
Group)
Conflict Group
Number of
Means Used
None
One
Two
Three

Non-Conflict Group

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

1
19
2
2

4.2
79.2
8.3
8.3

1
5
4
2

8.3
41.7
33.3
16.7

With regard to sending state political information gathering, the conflict group
and non-conflict group exhibited comparable patterns of behavior. The non-conflict
group gathered sending state information with the exact same number of means as they
used to gather U.S. political information, and they used slightly more means to do so
than the conflict group did. Please see results in Table 23.
Table 23 - Means Used to Gather Sending State Political Information (Between Group)
Conflict Group
Number of
Means Used
None
One
Two
Three

Non-Conflict Group

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

2
14
6
2

8.3
58.3
25.0
8.3

1
5
4
2

8.3
41.7
33.3
16.7

Among those eligible to vote (U.S. citizens over 18 years old) 87.0 percent of the
conflict group voted in the receiving state, compared with just 37.5 percent of the nonconflict group.

Pearson Chi-Square tests demonstrated a statistically significant
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relationship between conflict/non-conflict group status and voting in a U.S. Election
with x2 (1) = 7.582 and p = .006.
While 20.8 percent of the conflict group voted in the sending state, no one from
the non-conflict group did. The relationship between conflict group status and sending
state voting was not statistically significant, however.

I provide these correlation

procedures in Appendix A.
Over 70 percent of the conflict group had a U.S. political party affiliation,
compared to 66.7 percent of the non-conflict group. Nearly 20.8 percent of the conflict
group affiliated with a sending state party, compared to 16.7 percent of the non-conflict
group. Group status was not correlated with wither U.S. or sending states political party
affiliation.
When it came to contributing money to U.S. candidates, the groups
demonstrated equal activism.

Within both groups, 33.3 percent of participants

contributed to a U.S. candidate or party and 66.7 percent of each group had never made
a contribution to a U.S. political candidate or party. The participants who did varied in
the frequency of donation:

16.7 percent of the conflict group had contributed once

only; 8.3 percent of the non-conflict group had contributed once only; 16.7 percent of
each group contributed every one or two years, and 16.7 percent of the non-conflict
group contributed more than once a year, while none of the conflict group did. The
groups were matched also on their financial contributions to sending state political
parties and candidates. In both groups, 91.7 percent had never made a contribution to
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a sending state political party (since relocating to the United States), and the remaining
8.3 percent of both groups had. The relationship between conflict group status and
contributions to U.S. political parties was not significant.
Contacting a US political figure was higher among non-conflict participants with
20.8 percent of conflict participants contacting a U.S. official, and 58.3 percent of nonconflict participants contacting a U.S. official. Conflict or non-conflict group status was a
predictor of contacting U.S. officials with x2 (3) = .505 and p =.027, and Lambda = .333
with p =.196. As discovered among the conflict group participants, the non-conflict
group also engaged with U.S. political officials to discuss issues relevant to the sending
state.
Although twice as many non-conflict participants than non-conflict participants
contacted U.S. officials, twice as many people in the conflict group contacted a sending
state political figure than the non-conflict group. In the conflict group, 16.7 percent of
people contacted a sending state official, compared to just 8.3 percent of the nonconflict group. There were no significant associations between conflict/non-conflict
group status and contact with country of origin political figures.
Conflict group members did not use as many means of influencing U.S. political
opinions as the non-conflict group. Over 35 percent of the conflict group used one or
more methods to influence U.S. political opinions, compared to 41.6 percent of the nonconflict group. Conflict groups used slightly more means than the non-conflict-group,
however. The distribution is provided in Table 24. Correlation tests were insignificant.
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There were fewer methods used to influence sending state political opinions,
overall. Just over 33 percent of conflict group participants used one or more methods of
influence, compared to 41.7 percent of non-conflict participants.

There were no

statistical associations. Table 25 contains these results.
Table 24 - Methods Used to Influence U.S. Opinions (Between Groups)

None
One
Two
Methods Used to Influence
Political Opinions - US
Three
Four
Six or more
Total

Conflict

NonConflict

Total

Count

15

5

20

Percent

62.5%

41.7%

55.6%

Count

3

4

7

Percent

12.5%

33.3%

19.4%

Count

3

1

4

Percent

12.5%

8.3%

11.1%

Count

2

0

2

Percent

8.3%

.0%

5.6%

Count

1

0

1

Percent

4.2%

.0%

2.8%

Count

0

2

2

Percent

.0%

16.7%

5.6%

Count

24

12

36

Percent

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%
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Table 25 - Methods Used to Influence Sending State Opinions (Between Groups)

None
One
Methods Used to Influence
Political Opinions - COO
Two
Three
Total

Conflict

NonConflict

Total

Count

16

7

23

Percent

66.7%

58.3%

63.9%

Count

4

3

7

Percent

16.7%

25.0%

19.4%

Count

3

2

5

Percent

12.5%

16.7%

13.9%

Count

1

0

1

Percent

4.2%

.0%

2.8%

Count

24

12

36

Percent

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

When it came to being politically active pre- and post-migration, no one in the
non-conflict group said they were never really active, which differs from the conflict
group. When excluding cases where the participant was a young child at the time of
migration, 23.1 percent of the conflict group said they were more active before
migration, 23.1 percent were more active after migration, and 15.4 percent said they
had the same level of involvement.

Every person in the non-conflict group who

migrated as an adult said they were more politically active after migrating to the United
States.

The association between group and level of activity was not significant,

however.
When I asked participants whether they were currently more politically active in
their sending or receiving state, results were mixed.

Both groups had the same
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percentage of participants who said they were more active in the United States. More
non-conflict participants than conflict participants selected “about the same.” However,
tests did not reveal statistically significance between conflict group status and political
activity. Only one person in the entire study population said they were more active in
their sending state. I provide cross-tabulation procedures in Table 26.
Table 26 - Political Activity in the Sending and Receiving State (Between Groups)

US
More Politically Active Country of Origin
in US or Country of
About the same
Origin
in both
Not active in
either
Total

Conflict

NonConflict

Total

Count

10

5

15

Percent

41.7%

41.7%

41.7%

Count

0

1

1

Percent

.0%

8.3%

2.8%

Count

9

2

11

Percent

37.5%

16.7%

30.6%

Count

5

4

9

Percent

20.8%

33.3%

25.0%

Count

24

12

36

Percent

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

More participants from the non-conflict group said sending state politics were
more important or held about the same importance to them as U.S. politics. Within the
conflict group, 33 percent said sending state issues were of the same of more
importance to them then receiving state issues, compared to 58.4 percent of the nonconflict group.

The relationship between conflict status and political issues of

importance was statistically insignificant.
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A Bosnian women described why sending state issues held equal importance to
receiving state issues for her,
Well, my dream is to come back there and live there….I have a lot of friends
and family members there, and they’ve just been through so much that I
wish everything would be 100 perfect, and everybody would have a job, and
everybody’s life would be just wonderful. They deserve that after
everything they’ve gone through. And then here [is important] obviously
because I live here, and I can’t say that I’m 100 percent completely
disconnected from what’s going on here because I’ve been here for 16
years, and whether I like it or not I’m involved.
I conducted an interview with a 45-year old Albanian man who could not be
included in the quantitative analysis, because he did not meet study criteria. However,
he provided an interesting anecdotal response.

He indicated that he was more

politically active in the affairs of Montenegro than the United States. He said,

Because over there it’s still not right. Things still need to be done…I don’t
mean anymore uprising like we did in Kosova through the war. Now we do
it through the democratic and human rights channels.
So, while he is from Albania and resides in the United States, he actually felt
his greatest level of political involvement was in a third state in which he felt a
strong to ethnic “kin” in need of advocates abroad. I touch on this theme once
more in Chapter 7 as it is a recurring anecdotal result throughout the analysis.

Comparing Conflict and Non-Conflict Group Political Participation
Scores
Actual U.S. participation scores for the conflict group spread from 2 to 13 points,
with the median score being 4.5 and standard deviation of 2.75. The mean score was
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5.29. Sending state scores ranged from 0 to 13 points, with the median score being 3.0.
The mean score was 3.25, and the standard deviation was 2.78. United States political
participation scores for the non-conflict group had a broader range from 0-16. The
median score was 5.5, and the mean score was 6.58 with a standard deviation of 4.69.
Non-conflict group scores for the sending state ranged from 0-7. The median score was
2.0, and the mean score was 3.08 with a standard deviation of 2.57.

Summary of Between-Group Results
I summarize between group politic al results in Tables 27 and 28.
Table 27 - Summary of Political Indicators (Between Group)

Sending State Indicator
Gathered Information about Politics
Voted in Election
Political Party Affiliation
Contributed Money to Political Candidate/Party
Contacted Political Figure
Attempted to Influence Political Opinions
Mean Political Participation Score

Conflict
Group
92%
20%
21%
8%
17%
32%
3.25

Non-Conflict
Group
92%
0
17%
8%
8%
41%
3.08

Table 28 – Self-Identified Sending State Activity (Between Group)

Indicator
More Politically Active in Sending State
Same Activity in Sending and Receiving State
Sending State Political Issues Most Important
Sending/Receiving Issues Equally Important

Conflict
Group
0
38%
4%
29%

Non-Conflict
Group
8%
17%
17%
42%
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Although outcomes were close, there were some key differences between
groups. For one, 20% of the conflict group voted in the sending state, while no one in
the non-conflict group did. This supports the hypothesis that conflict migrants will act in
the sending state more so than non-conflict migrants. This was interesting considering
that the non-conflict group displayed nearly double the rate of dual citizenship that the
conflict group did. I suggest the non-conflict group had a higher rate of citizenship due
to confusion within the conflict group over how to maintain citizenship and among
some, a degree of fear about maintaining citizenship in the home state while it was rife
with conflict and instability. The non-conflict group overall appeared to have beer
better advised of their right to maintain dual citizenship, and they frequently did no to
support home country property ownership and to maintain a passport for frequent
travel back to the home state.
The conflict group also had a slightly higher rate of sending state political party
affiliation and contact with sending state political figures. However, the difference was
very small.

The “attempted to influence political opinions” indicator produced

contradictory results for the sending state analysis. The non-conflict group had a higher
rate of contact with sending state officials that the non-conflict group. This coincided
also to a high rate of contact with U.S. officials regarding sending state issues.
Anecdotal support overall lent insight to Albanian political contact on behalf of the
sending state.
interaction,

For example, a 31-year old male participant described a typical
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The first step would be to just get in touch with officials, okay. If we get
in touch with them, we request further explanation of what do they think
over certain issues. If they would give us an explanation, through that
explanation they give us, we would understand from where they are
coming from. And then, maybe we can intervene if they are misled over
something. Because what we actually are looking for is just to make sure
that like the situation is treated fairly, okay.
For example, the participant mentioned above said,
Actually it [contact] was during Kosovo conflict, and it was mainly the
local congressman to try to intervene and pass the resolution to
intervene in Kosovo, because it was very bad ethnic cleansing.
Another participant, a 52 year old Albanian man elaborated on the interaction as
well. He said,
Starting from senators, okay, and the Governor’s office, we have been
more than six-seven times a year. And the state level too – senators of
the state of Michigan, congressmen, all those people…In July we are
having an event for Gary Peters, and also we’re blessed because Wesley
Clark is coming to that event. And actually I got a letter that Gary Peters
sent, because we have a grievance in Montenegro that is unacceptable…I
received a [copy of a] letter that he sent to the President and Prime
Minister of Montenegro.
An anecdotal interview I conducted with a 45-year old Albanian man provided a
description of a similar interaction,
My opinion is that U.S. should get deeply involved to tell them [Albanian
government] what democracy is in U.S., and to tell them that those
[Albanian] ethnic groups need to be treated the same in Montenegro.
That’s why I went with the [U.S.] Congress people in 2005 to
Montenegro, and we spoke with all high-level Prime Minister and
President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro…And that’s why
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Congressman Eliot Engel came with us and told them that they need to
have municipality of Tuzi, self-determination for those areas, so they
need to have full municipality so they can control their own territories,
their own government, and police…But they can have full municipality of
Tuzi – that’s major project we got right now.
A 46 year old Kosovar woman and her husband owned an Albanian-centric radio
station for 11 years. She describes their efforts to influence opinions in the sending and
receiving state,
Me and my husband own radio for 11 years – now we don’t have…A lot
was going on in Kosova. I used to read news, and my husband was
making all the programs, and he was the host. It was political news. We
interview everybody…We met a lot of people here in Michigan and from
there [Kosovo] too – everybody who came to visit United States, we
interviewed them. It was interesting because it was a lot of issues
discussing a lot of things in community, over there, what going on
here…My husband say they are fighting and giving their life [Kosovars],
and we have to do something, and we did that. We put on the radio all
those community events, what they were doing, how they helping people
over there like donating money and clothes and everything to send there
during the war. It was big help during the war, especially. We helped
them a lot for any kind of information for immigration, health, where
they can find like free clinics, free doctors.”
A 24 year old Kosovar woman describes a U.S. protest she attended regarding
the imprisonment of prisoners in Montenegro,
The protest was about wanting a fair trial for Montenegrins suspected of
terrorism in Montenegro – domestic terrorism. This was a protest for the
U.S. government to ask Montenegro for a fair trial of the Albanians, who
three of them were U.S. citizens. It was a protest in D.C. We wanted to
make sure that the U.S. required and asked and pressured the
Montenegro government to give a fair and speedy trial to the 14 that
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were accused, three of which were U.S. citizens. So we were kind of
riding on those three backs to get the same treatment for all 14.
As these examples illustrate, the Albanian and Kosovar contact with sending and
receiving state political officials was less influences by country of origin and more so by
a shared sense of “cause” around issues affecting not only the home state, but ethnic
kin

in

states

throughout

the

sending

region.
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CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS
Climbing international migration rates and enhanced modes of social and
political engagement across migrant populations have rendered transnational political
participation an increasingly salient issue. International migration has always held
questions up for scholars’ examination as immigrants have always maintained ties back
to the homeland via kinship networks, financial remittances, and some political
influence. However, widespread allowance of dual citizenship coupled with the up-tothe minute information gathering and engagement proffered by technological
advancements allow today’s migrants to assume more organized and influential
transnational political roles than ever before. Additionally, this influence challenges our
notions of political space and traditional definitions of the nation-state as a bounded
political entity.
International migration has far-reaching domestic and international policy
effects, one of which lies in the political decision-making of the migrants themselves.
Once departed the homeland, do migrants continue to act politically in their sending
state, or do they abandon their former trappings in order to become engaged in their
new receiving community? How do these choices vary depending on the conditions of
departure? Specifically, how does transnational political behavior differ between forced
and voluntary migrants?
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Wood (1994) suggests that forced and voluntary migrants have similar
experiences and produce similar patterns of transnational political behavior. However,
others (Kunz, 1973; Richmond, 1993, etc.) suggest that the condition of
“involuntariness” experienced by forced migrants produces both emotional and
practical effects that steer political practice. Specifically, sudden departure leaves
forced migrants with less social and financial capital than voluntary migrants. They
typically have not had opportunities to gain the language instruction, job training, or
access to new networks that normally aid in assimilation and foster later political
engagement in the receiving community. As such, I suggest that conflict migrants are
more likely to participate politically in their sending state than their receiving state postresettlement. I also propose a second hypothesis suggesting that conflict migrants
participate more than non-conflict migrants in sending state politics post-resettlement.
In comparing political indicators between two conflict groups and also between
conflict and non-conflict groups, I found that Levitt et al (2003) most aptly sum up the
state of transnational practice among today’s many migrant groups. They write,
…not all migrants are engaged in transnational practices and that
those who are, do so with considerable variation in the sectors, levels,
strength, and formality of their involvement. Similarly, the levels of
transmigrant activities also vary. The links between migrant associations
and their home towns, or church-to-church ties between sending and
receiving communities, are often aimed at establishing very specific and
local (what some call "translocal") connections. But for some groups,
transnational practices are no longer about affirming identities to a
specific place, but instead about their enduring membership in broader
ethnic, religious or occupational groups…
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As such, the type and level of transnational activity certainly varied across
interview participants. Within my examination of Hypothesis 1, I compared political
indicators for activity in the sending and receiving state and also a comparison of mean
participation scores. To re-summarize the sending and receiving state indicators:
Indicator
Gathered Information about Politics
Voted in Election
Political Party Affiliation
Contributed Money to Political Candidate/Party
Contacted Political Figure
Attempted to Influence Political Opinions
Mean Political Participation Score

Indicator
More Politically Active Overall*
Political Issues Most Important

Sending State
0
4%

Sending
State
92%
21%
21%
8%
16%
33%
3.25

Receiving
State
96%
87%
70%
33%
21%
36%
5.29

US
41%
67%

Same
36%
29%

These results did not lend support to my hypothesis that conflict migrants would
participate more in the sending state than in the receiving state.

I think that

participation was skewed more toward the receiving state for several reasons. For one,
conflict participants noted confusion over dual citizenship opportunities, access to
sending state voting and other mechanisms of sending state participation. Many simply
did not know how to participate effectively, even if they had a desire to do so. Others
indicated simply that as citizens of the United States, they felt it appropriate, and at
times necessary, to become a part of the U.S. political structure.

Additionally, there

were several conflict participants who indicated a desire to withdraw from sending state
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politics due to the negative associations produced by their conflict experience and a
general fear and mistrust of the sending state structure. As Wahlbeck (1999) and Kelly
(2003) suggest, conflict often destroys and distorts old sending state political ties for
departed migrants. And as Frykman (2001) argues, sometimes conflict migrants become
more involved in the receiving state than the sending state, because they have simply
had enough. Open-ended interview responses support these assertions. For example, I
asked a 25-year old male Bosnian participant, “Do you still feel, in a sense, like a citizen
of Bosnia?” He replied,
Not really, because this is where I live now. I mean I will always go back
and everything. I’m always going to be a Bosnian. But even though most
of my [extended] family is there, I’m here with my dad and my mom. But
I pretty much grew up here. I like it here. I mean I like it there too, but
it’s too much trauma for my parents there and everything. I mean we’re
happy here, you know.

A 46-year old Kosovar woman explained also,
Because when I lost my country, I left my country. I wanted to live
somewhere where it’s more secure, and where my child has a future.
Getting citizenship, you feel like you belong to that country, and you
work for that...
A 35 year old Bosnian woman explained her reasoning for straying away from
sending state politics as well. She said,

I think both [sending and receiving state politics are important], although
I try to keep myself away as much as I can from Bosnian politics. All I
know about Bosnian politics is actually through my husband, because
he’s the one that keeps up. I try not to read anything that would kind of
disturb, and I tell him not to tell me bad things. He’s sometimes
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encouraging in his words or discouraging in his words about what is
happening in Bosnia. So generally, both, but for some reason it is easier
for me to be aware of things that happen here than in Bosnia.
A 50 year old Bosnian woman described her withdrawal as well, highlighting both
a lack of faith in the “old” system as well as her emotional aversion to remaining
involved. She said,
After I left my country, I made a decision. I made a promise, and I didn’t
break it. I would never watch the news or politics again. Sometimes my
husband or my soon try to get me into it, but I am out very fast. Basically,
that’s my decision and so far I’ve survived. For me, watching the TV here is
a waste of time. I am so used to our old system, it is still in me that I just
don’t want to. I tell my husband that if there is a war, then let me know.
Don’t get me wrong, it doesn’t necessarily mean that I don’t know about
politics. I studied it. I finished law school. I know how everything functions.
I am well-informed, but I do not think it is a good thing for my health.

Although the population was too small to draw a representative statistical
conclusion, most anecdotal withdrawal sentiments were expressed by women. Mahler
(83) discusses gendered results when examining transnational activity, “Men may
dominate transnational fields with respect to women in their households.

Often

planning activities, taking the lead in transnational overtures, and at times, steering the
direction of their spouses’ and/or family’s transnational relationships.” This seemed to
be the case at times, but more so it seemed to be more closely tied to anxiety over the
departure experience and a desire to disassociate from the trauma of having endured
conflict and systemic collapse.
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Will children of transmigrants opt to forge a transnational life? How will this
differ from their parents?

First generation professionals frequently maintain

transnational social and familial ties, because they have more social and financial capital
with which to travel back and forth. (Portes and Rumbault, 2006:26) Do transnational
practices vary along generational lines? But Portes and Rumbaut (1990) suggest that
cultural practices and values become steadily “whittle away” from generation to
generation, such that third generation migrants scarcely resemble their grandparents in
their social, cultural and political practices.
Portes and Rumbault (2006: 199) suggest that because of the initial
confrontation of language barriers and cultural differences, first generation immigrants
often “lack voice.” Nativist campaigns against first generation immigrants often spawn
retaliatory attitudes in the second generation. “More attuned to American culture and
fluent in English, the offspring of immigrants have gained ‘voice’ and have used it to
reaffirm identities attacked previously with so much impunity.”

However, when examining Kosovar activity in conjunction with Albanian activity,
transnational efforts were linked more to a shared ethnic status and a desire to right
perceived wrongs committed against the broader ethnic group or a kin state. Poulton,
(1997: 285) defines ”kin state” as “a state composed of and governed by a majority
community, for which groups who reside outside the state’s sovereign territory
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maintain a string affinity as a result of shared ethnicity, culture, religion, language or
perceived history.”
Where there’s a shared kinship, what else doesn’t matter?
Shared ethnicity/kinship undermined effects of conflict
The relationship between country of origin and U.S. political contact was
significant at x2(3) = .698, p = .011.

Citizenship and Repatriation
Among Conflict Group participants who were U.S. citizens, reported reasons for
obtaining U.S. citizenship included the ease of travel and the perceived protection
afforded by traveling with a U.S. passport. A 25-year old Bosnian man elaborated “I live
here – I pretty much grew up here. I’m Bosnian, but still I mean I grew up here. It’s my
country too, now, you know. And plus, it’s powerful – whenever you go travel, you
show the U.S. passport, you know, you don’t need no visa or nothing. They treat you
differently.”
However, several participants obtained U.S. citizenship for reasons related to
their specific circumstance as conflict survivors.

I engaged in several anecdotal

conversations about “citizenship” and what it’s like to “feel like a citizen” of one country
or another. Some participants still felt connected to their homeland as citizens, and
others felt more detached.

For example, I asked a a 25-year old male Bosnian

participant, “Do you still feel, in a sense, like a citizen of Bosnia?” He replied, “Not
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really, because this is where I live now. I mean I will always go back and everything. I’m
always going to be a Bosnian. But even though most of my [extended] family is there,
I’m here with my dad and my mom. But I pretty much grew up here. I like it here. I
mean I like it there too, but it’s too much trauma for my parents there and everything. I
mean we’re happy here, you know.”
I conducted an anecdotal interview with a 45 year old Albanian male who did not
meet study criteria, because he migrated to the United States in 1980. He explained his
rationale about citizenship status by saying, “That’s the only citizenship I got now,
because I don’t have any other countries.

I’m not Yugoslavian – I was born in

Yugoslavia, but I’m Albanian. And we don’t have no Albanian citizenship in Yugoslavia –
you have to become Yugoslavian citizenship.”

Technology
26 year old Bosnian woman started a non-profit after interacting with people she had a
dialogue with on an Internet website that was “targeting” people from her city. The site
included news, photos and a chat forum. Formal relationships were not far behind. She
said,

We got to know each other pretty well and just started thinking that
maybe we should start doing something to help out. And then we got
some money together and registered the agency as a nonprofit over
there [in Bosnia]. We’ve been helping – not doing too much – maybe 2-3
times a year, but we would some money – and work with people that are
living there to find somebody that needs help.
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I asked her if the interaction was largely personal or virtual, and she responded, “I see
them [the other group members] when I’m in Bosnia.

I’m there almost every

summer…But it’s been really challenging because everything that we do is online. If
want to meet to make a decision, we’re on the MSN Messenger talking to each other.”
Members of their group hail from the United States, Western Europe, Australia and
Canada. I asked her whether she considered the group to be politically active in Bosnia.
She said, “Well we’re trying to be not political at all. We don’t want to get involved in
that.”

30 year old Bosnian Male : Do you ever send money back to support any
projects in your home country?

Not really. I support only – it’s a group called – it’s not political, but it’s
like young people basically – it’s a movement – Revolt. It’s on Facebook –
I can send you some or email you. Just find me, my first name and last
name, and then Detroit, and that’s where it is. It’s just basically young
people criticizing all this bullshit that’s going on as far as politics on there,
you know, like police doing what the fuck they wanna do, politicians
doing what the fuck they wanna do, you know, this and that. You know,
they want a little bit better for the people, I guess, start moving forward
basically. It’s basically people in Bosnia, just throughout the whole
Bosnia. Like it’s young people, between 18-30, maybe, you see what I’m
saying? It’s basically what they do is criticize all this, you know, they
want a little bit better for the people. Like crimes, this and that, like
police not doing nothing about it. They’re not putting in so much work as
they should and stuff like that.
Anecdotal Bosnian man over 50
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I offend them at least once a week…They have nightmares. I make sure
that they’re not comfortable. We established an organization, and it was
established during the war. I wouldn’t call it dissident because dissidents,
they fight. I don’t know how to define it – we are not struggling to take
power. All what we are doing, we are trying to politically educate
Bosnians so that they have an understanding of what is taking place. Part
of the culture is that anything what is going on national level is decide by
the powers – USA power, that power, this power…So we developed a
game. Whenever they [state powers] would make a move, we would just
explain [to Bosnians] what it means…We do that through the Internet.
We have two lists – one is in English, the other is in Bosnian. And in
English, it is not just Bosnians – it is for American public.
Goldring elaborates further, “…transnational social fields, and localities of origin in particular,
provide a special context in which people can improve their social position, and perhaps their
power, make claims about their changing status and have it appropriately valorized, and also
participate in changing their place of origin so that it becomes more consistent with their
changing expectations and statuses…” (Goldring, 1998: 167) this has been shown to lend
leverage to leaders who are able to succeed in a transnational space more so than the
community of origin.

Future Directions
Communist/failed state
Political space/place
Refugee status matters w Bosnians, not as much w Kosovars…
Portes et al 1999 AS QUOTED IN KIVISTO 2001….”Those with higher levels of
social capital would be more likely to forge transnational linkages than those with less
capital…
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Despite globalization’s destabilization of the notion of states as free-standing entities,
Glick Schiller et al (1992) point out that the nation-state persists as the primary
structure by which we organize and govern. Brubaker (1996: 14) defines a nation as
“collective

individuals

capable

of

coherent,

purposeful

collective

action.”

Conceptualizing transnationalism requires developing some understanding of nationalist
loyalty as an organizing principle, even when those loyalties transcend traditional state
boundaries. To be sure, even in a transnational existence, action is formed first around
the national, whether encouraged by the state or sought out by the individual.
Brubaker (1996: 5) writes of “transborder nationalisms” as being these “external
national homelands” that establish obligations and responsibilities transcendent of
geographic boundaries and legal citizenship. Yet, globalization and transnationalism do
challenge traditional concepts of the nation-state.

Questions of jurisdiction, over-

lapping institutions and citizenship are not easily answered.
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Appendix A – Hypothesis One Correlation Tables

Conflict Group: U.S. Political Information Gathering

Control

Cramer’s V

Significant if
p<.01

Lambda

Significant if
p<.05

df

Sending State

.480

.137

.250

.140

3

Gender

.348

.406

.091

.827

3

Religion

.457

.123

.250

.064

6

Age at Interview

.478

.140

.333

.363

3

Conflict Group: Sending State Political Information Gathering
Control

Cramer’s V

Significance

Lambda

Significance

df

Sending State

.299

.543

.000

n/a

3

Gender

.617

.028

.545

.090

3

Religion

.520

.043

.250

.064

6

Age at
Interview

.602

.039

.300

.261

3

Conflict Group: U.S. Voting

Control

Chi-Square
Cramer’s V

Significant if >

Lambda

Sending State

.014

.907

n/a

Significant if
<.05
n/a

df
1
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Gender

.755

.385

n/a

n/a

1

Religion

.257

.468

.000

n/a

2

Age at Interview

.491

.484

n/a

n/a

1

Conflict Group: Sending State Voting
Control

Chi Square/
Cramer’s V

Significance

Lambda

Significance

df

Sending State

.505

.477

n/a

n/a

1

Gender

.511

.475

n/a

n/a

1

Religion

.266

.428

.000

n/a

2

Age at
Interview

.253

.615

n/a

n/a

1

Conflict Group: Receiving State Political Party
Control

Chi Square/
Cramer’s V

Significance

Lambda

Significance

Sending State

df

1

Gender

.509

.476

Religion

.278

.394

Age at
Interview

0202

.653

1
.000

n/a

2
1

Conflict Group: Sending State Political Party
Control

Chi Square/

Significance

Lambda

Significance

df
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Cramer’s V
Sending State

.505

.477

1

Gender

.087

.769

1

Religion

.266

.428

Age at
Interview

2.274

.132

.000

n/a

2
1

Conflict Group: Receving State Political Contribution
Control

Chi Square/
Cramer’s V

Significance

Lambda

Significance

df

Sending State
Gender
Religion
Age at
Interview

Conflict Group: Sending State Political Contribution
Control

Sending State
Gender
Religion
Age at
Interview

Chi Square/
Cramer’s V

Significance

Lambda

Significance

df
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Conflict Group: Influence U.S. Political Opinions
Control

Chi Square/
Cramer’s V

Significance

Lambda

Significance

Country of
Origin

.395

.441

.125

.307

Gender

.365

.527

.273

.307

4

Religion

.473

.216

.250

1.852

8

Age at
Interview

.516

.171

.333

.337

df

4

4

Conflict Group: Influence Sending State Political Opinions
Control

Chi Square/
Cramer’s V

Significance

Lambda

Significance

Country of
Origin

.464

.161

.250

.307

Gender

.365

.363

.273

.244

3

Religion

.427

.188

.250

.244

6

Age at
Interview

.421

.236

.250

.064

df

3

3

Correlation Tests: Politically Active Before or After Migration
Control

Cramer’s V Significance Lambda Significance df

Country of Origin .581

.222

.250

.559

3
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Gender

.380

.599

.200

.652

3

Religion

.884

.118

.571

.067

6

Age at Interview

.527

.307

.000

n/a

3

Correlation Tests: Politically Active in Sending or Receiving State
Control

Cramer’s V Significance Lambda Significance df

Country of Origin .079

.928

.000

n/a

2

Gender

.495

.053

.273

.487

2

Religion

.241

.594

.000

.000

4

Age at Interview

.310

.315

.250

.163

0

Correlation Tests: Sending or Receiving State Issues Most Important
Control
Country of
Origin
Gender
Religion
Age at Interview

Cramer’s V

Significance

Lambda

Significance

df
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Appendix B – Hypothesis Two Correlation Tables
Sending State Political Issues are Important to Me
Control

Cramer’s V

Significance

Lambda

Significance

df

Conflict/NonConflict Group

.138

.708

.000

n/a

1

Sending State Foreign Policy is Important to Me
Control

Chi-Square

Significance

Lambda

Significance

df

Conflict/NonConflict Group

2.250

.134

.000

n/a

1
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Appendix C – Instrumentation
Transnational Political Behavior among Diasporic Migrants
Face-to-Face Interview Guide
Wayne State University
Hello, my name is Amanda Hanlin, and I am a student at Wayne State University. I am trying to
learn more about how people born in other countries adjust to living in the United States. I am
hoping you can help me by answering some questions about your views on citizenship and
politics both in the United States and in your home country.
Before we begin, I just wanted to go over some important points. First, this interview is
completely voluntary. You can refuse to participate, and you do not have to answer any
questions you do not want to answer. You can end this interview at any time. Also, your
answers will be kept completely confidential. I will not use your name at all when I review the
results of the interview.
I would like to first as you some questions about your background.
1. CODE WITHOUT ASKING

Male 1

Female 2

2. In what city and country were you born?
3. Would you consider the town in which you were born to be URBAN or RURAL?
Urban 1
Rural 2
Suburb 3
Don’t know

4

4. In what city and country were you at the time that you first migrated?
5. Would you consider the town in which you were at the time of your migration to be URBAN
or RURAL?
Urban 1
Rural 2
Suburb 3
Don’t know

4

6. What year did you come to the United States?
7. Have you lived in the United States ever since [year]?
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Yes
No

1
2

8. Which of these categories best describes your status when you came to the U.S. in [date]?
Permanent Resident
Temporary Resident
Without Papers
Temporary Work Visa
Student Visa
Tourist Visa
Dependent on someone else’s visa
Expired visa
Asylee
Temporary Protected Immigrant (TPS)
Other (specify) ___________

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

9. Are you a U.S. citizen currently?
Yes
No

1
2

If yes  9a. What year did you become a U.S. citizen?
If yes  9b. How long did it take you to obtain citizenship (in years)?
If yes  9c. Why did you decide to pursue U.S. citizenship?
If no  9d. Do you plan to become a U.S. citizen?
Yes
No

1
2

Open-ended follow up  9e. Why or why not?
10. Are you still a citizen of your home country?
Yes
No

1
2

11. Do you still own property in your home country?
Yes
No

1
2
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12. Since you left your home country, how many times have you been back to visit?
13. How many of your parents still live in your home country?
14. How many of your parents live in the United States?
15. How many of your children live in your home country?
16. How many of your children live in the United States?
17. How many of your brothers and sisters currently live in your home country?
18. How many of your brothers and sisters currently live in the United States?
19. How about your friends? Would you say that you have more friends living in the U.S. or
living in your home country?
More in U.S.
More in home country
About the same in both locations
Don’t know

1
2
3
4

20. Since you moved to the US, have you sent money back to friends or family in your home
country?
Yes
No

1
2

If yes  20a. About how often?
Once only
Every one or two years
About once a year
More than once a year
Don't Know
Refused

1
2
3
4
98
99

21. Do you ever send money back to support any projects in your home country?
Yes
No

1
2

If yes  21a. About how often?
Once only
Every one or two years

1
2
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About once a year
More than once a year
Don't Know
Refused

3
4
98
99

22. In your own words, please tell me why you decided to move to the United States.
23. If you had to pick the statement that most fits your PRIMARY reason for relocating to the
United States, which of these categories best describes the PRIMARY reason why you came to
the United States? Please choose only one response.
To find work
To reunite with family
To get an education
To get a “better life” overall
Fled from conflict
Fled political persecution
Fled religious persecution
Other (please specify)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

24. Using the same series of statements, what (if any) would be the next best statement to
describe what most influenced you to move to the United States? Please choose only one
response.
To find work
To reunite with family
To get an education
To get a “better life” overall
Fled from conflict
Fled political persecution
Fled religious persecution
Other (please specify)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

25. Would you ever consider moving back to your home country?
25a. Why or why not?
Now I’d like to ask for your thoughts and opinions about things related to politics and
citizenship. Please remember that there are no right or wrong answers. I’m really just
interested in listening to your opinions in your own words.
26. Are there any political issues that are important to you? Can you tell me about them?
27. Would you say you were a more politically active person before or after you migrated to the
United States?
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Before
After
About the same level of involvement in both
Was never politically active
Don’t know

1
2
3
4
5

27a. How come?
28. Today, are you more politically active with regard to U.S. political affairs or the political
affairs of your home country?
U.S.
Home Country
About the same level of involvement in both
Not active in either
Don’t know

1
2
3
4
5

28a. How come?
29. Which political events (elections, policy change, etc.) are more important to you currently –
those of the United States, or those of your home country?
U.S.
Home Country
About the same importance
Neither are important to me
Don’t know

1
2
3
4
5

29a. How come?
30. Do you take interest in US foreign policy with regard to your home country?
If yes  30a.Can you tell me a little bit about what interests you?
Now, I'd like to ask you how often you have participated in certain political and community
activities. For all of these, just give me your best estimate, and don't worry that you might not
remember the exact number of times you participated in each activity.
31. Since you relocated to the United States, have you contacted any political figure (elected
official, bureaucrat, local leader, etc.) in the United States to relay your views on some issue?
Yes
No

1
2
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If yes  31a. How often would you say you did this?
Once only
Every one or two years
About once a year
More than once a year
Don't Know
Refused

1
2
3
4
98
99

31b. Can you tell me more about this interaction in your own words?
32. Since you relocated to the United States, have you contacted any political figure (elected
official, bureaucrat, local leader, etc.) in your home country to relay your views on some issue?
Yes
No

1
2

If yes  32a. How often would you say you did this?
Once only
Every one or two years
About once a year
More than once a year
Don't Know
Refused

1
2
3
4
98
99

32b. Can you tell me more about this interaction in your own words?
33. Do you identify yourself with any U.S. political party?
Yes
No

1
2

If yes  33a. Would you say you are...
Democrat
Republican
Independent
Other (please specify)
Don’t Know
Refused

1
2
3
4
98
99

34. Do you identify yourself with any political party in your home country?
Yes

1
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No

2

If yes  34a. Which party would that be?
35. Since you relocated to the United States, have you contributed money to U.S. political
candidates or parties?
Yes
No
Not sure
Refused

1
2
98
99

If yes  35a. How often would you say you did this?
Once only
Every one or two years
About once a year
More than once a year
Don't Know
Refused

1
2
3
4
98
99

36. Since you relocated to the United States, have you contributed money to political candidates
or parties in your home country?
Yes
No
Not sure
Refused

1
2
98
99

If yes  36a. How often would you say you did this?
Once only
Every one or two years
About once a year
More than once a year
Don't Know
Refused

1
2
3
4
98
99

37. Since you relocated to the United States, have you voted in any local, state or federal U.S
election?
Yes
No
Not sure
Refused

1
2
98
99
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If yes  37a. How often would you say you did this?
Once only
Every one or two years
About once a year
More than once a year
Don't Know
Refused

1
2
3
4
98
99

38. Since you relocated to the United States, have you voted in any election in your home
country?
Yes
No
Not sure
Refused

1
2
98
99

If yes  38a. How often would you say you did this?
Once only
Every one or two years
About once a year
More than once a year
Don't Know
Refused

1
2
3
4
98
99

39. Since you relocated to the United States, have you used any of these means to influence
anyone’s opinions about politics? In this case, I’m interested in how you’ve communicated with
people living in the United States. Please select ALL that apply.
Letter
Email
Internet Blog
Phone Call
Boycott some business or product
Other (please specify)

1
2
3
4
5
6

39a. Can you tell me a little bit more about that?
40. Since you relocated to the United States, have you used any of these means to influence
people’s opinions about politics? In this case, I’m interested in how you’ve communicated with
people living in your home country. Please select ALL that apply.
Letter

1
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Email
Internet Blog
Phone Call
Boycott some business or product
Other (please specify)

2
3
4
5
6

40a. Can you tell me a little bit more about that?
41. Can you tell me in your own words about any other ways you have participated in political
activities in the United States since you moved here?
42. How about in your home country? Can you tell me about any other ways you have
participated in political activities in your home country since you moved here?
43. Do you interact with any civic, cultural or social organizations? These can be based in the
United States or in your home country.
Yes
No

1
2

If yes  43a. Which ones?
If yes  43b. Can you tell me more about your involvement?
44. Are there any organizations that supported your move to the United States?
Yes
No
Not sure
Refused

1
2
98
99

If yes  (44a) Which ones?
If yes  (44b) In what way did they support you?

45. How do you gather information about U.S. politics? Please select all that apply.
Public information (radio, newspaper, television, websites, etc.)
Friends and/or family
Community Organizations
Other (please specify)
I do not gather information about U.S. politics
If yes  (45a) Can you be more specific about those sources?

1
2
3
4
5
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46. How do you gather information about politics in your home country? Please select all that
apply.
Public information (radio, newspaper, television, websites, etc.)
Friends and/or family
Community Organizations
Other (please specify)
I do not gather information about politics in my home country

1
2
3
4
5

If yes  (46a) Can you be more specific about those sources?
47. If you belong to a particular religion or faith, what is it?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Baptist
Buddhist
Christian (Protestant, Catholic, Roman Catholic, Greek, Orthodox, Mormon, etc.)
Hindu
Jewish
Muslim
Agnostic
Atheist
Religious, but does not belong to a particular religion
No religion
Other religion (SPECIFY)

48. What is the highest grade or year of school or college you completed in your home country?
No formal schooling
Elementary School (1-5)
Middle School (6-8)
High School (9-12)
1 year of college
2 years of college
3 years of college
4 years of college
5 or more years of college

99
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

If advanced study  48a. What was your course of study?
49. How many years of school have you completed in the United States?
No U.S. schooling
Attended some schooling in U.S. but didn’t complete a grade or year
Elementary School (1-5)
Middle School (6-8)

99
0
1
2
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High School (9-12)
1 year of college
2 years of college
3 years of college
4 years of college
5 or more years of college

3
4
5
6
7
8

If advanced study  49a. What was your course of study?
50. When you first moved to the United States, did you speak English?
Yes
No

1
2

51. How would you describe your current employment status?
Working
Looking for work
Keeping house
Going to school
Unable to work
Retired
Other ___________________

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

52. What is your annual salary at this job in US dollars?
Unemployed
Less than $25,000
$25,000 to $35,000
$35,000 to $45,000
$45,000to $55,000
$55,000 to $65,000
$65,000 or more

0
1
2
3
4
5
6

53. How would you describe your employment status before you left your home country?
Working
Looking for work
Keeping house
Going to school
Unable to work
Retired
Other ___________________

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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54. What was your annual salary in US dollars at the time that you left this job in your home
country?
Unemployed
Less than $25,000
$25,000 to $35,000
$35,000 to $45,000
$45,000to $55,000
$55,000 to $65,000
$65,000 or more

0
1
2
3
4
5
6

55. What year were you born?
56. What is your current marital status?
Single
Married
Widow
Other

1
2
3
4

57. Can you suggest other people who maybe willing to be contacted for interview?
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Appendix D – Study Recruitment Materials

Dear Sir/Madam,
As a doctoral candidate in Wayne State University’s (WSU) Department of Political Science, I am
conducting a study to better understand how individuals born outside of the United States view
and participate in politics here and abroad. I am gathering research information by interviewing
individuals who relocated to Metropolitan Detroit from other countries.
Your insights on these issues are important, and so I hope to include you as a participant in this
study. I am asking to schedule a personal interview with you at a location of your choice. The
interview will last approximately thirty minutes and will be of no financial cost to you. Your
interview responses will be kept completely confidential and reported in aggregate for research
purposes only. Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may withdraw at any time.
I will contact you again within the next few days. In the meantime, if you have any questions or
concerns, please contact me directly at 313-516-9633 or achanlin@wayne.edu. I really look
forward to speaking with you, and I hope I can count on your participation.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,

Amanda Hanlin
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[ALBANIAN]

I nderuar Zoteri/Zonje

Si nje kandidate per te mbrojtur Doktoraturen ne Shkenca Politike ne Universitetin Wayne State,
une jam duke bere nje studim per te kuptuar me mire, se si individet e lindur jashte Shteteve te
Bashkuara te Amerikes marrin pjese ne politiken Amerikane dhe ate jashte saj. Une po mbledh
informacione kerkimore duke intervistuar personat e ardhur ne Detroit.
Mendimet tuaja per keto ceshtje jane te rendesishme prandaj dhe une shpresoj qe dhe ju te
merrni pjese ne kete studim. Po kerkoj qe te leme nje takim se bashku, ne vendin qe deshironi
ju, per nje interviste personale (bisede). Intervista do te zgjase per rreth 30 minuta, dhe nuk do
te kete asnje kosto financiare per ju. Pergjigjet tuaja do te jene konfidenciale, dhe do te
raportohen ne grumbull per qellime kerkimore. Pjesemarrja juaj ne kete fushe eshte vullnetare,
dhe ju mund ta lini intervisten ne c’do momement qe deshironi.
Une do t’ju kontaktoj perseri ne ditet e ardhshme. Nderkohe, ne qofte se keni ndonje pyetje apo
shqetesim, ju lutem me kontaktoni ne Nr. e telefonit 313-516-9633 ose achanlin@wayne.edu.
Une me te vertete mezi po pres te flas me ju dhe shpresoj qe te jeni te pranishem.
Faleminderit per konsideraten.
Sinqerisht,

Amanda Hanlin
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[BOSNIAN]

Draga Sir/Madam,

Kao doktorski kandidat na Wayne State University (WSU) Odsjek političkih nauka, ja provodim
studije u cilju boljeg razumijevanja političkih gledišta pojedinaca rođenih izvan Sjedinjenih
Američkih Država i njihovog političkog sudjelovanja ovdje i u inostranstvu. Ja prikupljam
istraživacke informacije intervjuisanjem pojedinaca koji su se doselili u Detroit Metropolitan iz
drugih zemalja.
Vaša uvid u ova pitanja je važan, te se nadam da ću Vas uključiti kao sudionika u ovoj studiji.
Željela bih zakazati intervju s Vama na mjestu po Vašem izboru. Intervju će trajati otprilike
trideset minuta i bez ikakvih financijskih troškova za Vas.Vaši odgovori tokom intervjua će biti
potpuno povjerljivi i prikupljeni samo za istraživačke svrhe. Vaše sudjelovanje u ovoj studiji je
dobrovoljno i možete se povući u bilo koje vrijeme.
Ponovo ću Vas kontaktirati u roku od nekoliko sljedećih dana. U međuvremenu, ako imate bilo
kakvih pitanja ili nedoumica, kontaktirajte me direktno na 313-516-9633 ili
achanlin@wayne.edu. Unaprijed se radujem razgovoru s Vama i nadam se da mogu računati na
Vaše sudjelovanje.
S poštovanjem,

Amanda Hanlin
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Research Study Recruitment Flyer
Title of Study: Transnational Political Behavior among Diasporic Migrants
Purpose:
This is a research study that seeks to learn more about how families from other countries adjust to living
in the United States. Specifically, we are interested in understanding more about U.S. immigrants’ civic
and political behavior.
Who is doing the study?
The Principal Investigator for this study is Amanda Hanlin. She is a doctoral candidate in the Department
of Political Science at Wayne State University. She can be reached at 313-555-1212 or
myemailaddress@wayne.edu.
Who is sponsoring the study?
This study is being conducted at Wayne State University. The study is not funded, and it is being done for
the purposes of completing a doctoral dissertation.
Why am I being asked to participate?
You are being asked to participate because you are an adult over the age of 18 who relocated to the
United States from another country.
Why should I participate?
As a participant in this research study there will be no direct benefit to you, and you will not be paid to
participate. However, information from this study may benefit other people by creating new knowledge
about how foreign-born people adjust to life in the United States and the special needs and challenges
they have when participating in political systems here and in their home country. There are no known
risks to you in participating, and there is no cost to participate. Your identity will be kept strictly
confidential, and you will only be identified by a code name or number.
What am I being asked to do?
If you agree to take part in this research study, you will be asked to participate in one 30-60 minute inperson interview with a Wayne State University doctoral student. The student will interview you at a
location of your choice, and she will ask questions about your political participation habits in the United
States and your country of origin. You do not have to answer any interview questions that you do not
want to answer, and you may conclude the interview at any time.
How Can I Get Involved?
If you are willing to participate, or if you know others who may be willing to participate, please contact
Amanda Hanlin at (313) 555-1212 or myemailaddress@wayne.edu.
Thank you for your assistance with this important research study!
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Ftese rekrutimi per nje studim kerkimor
Titulli i Studimit: Sjellja reth Politikes Nderkombetare midis te ardhurve nga Diaspora
Qellimi: Ky eshte nje studim kerkimor qe ka per qellim te mesoje me shume se si familjet e ardhura nga
vende te tjera pershtaten me jeten ne Shtetet e Bashkuara te Amerikes. Ne vecanti, ne jemi te interesuar
te kuptojme me shume per jeten qytetare dhe sjelljen politike te emigranteve Amerikane.
Kush po e ben kete studim?
Studiuesi kryesor ne kete studim eshte Amanda Hanlin. Ajo eshte nje Kandidate per doktorature ne
Departamentin e Shkencave Politike ne Universitetin Wayne State. Ajo mund te gjendet ne numrin e
telefonit 313-555-1212 ose myemailaddress@wayne.edu.
Kush e sponsorizon kete studim?
Ky studim bo zhvillohet ne Universitetin Wayne State. Per kete studim nuk ka fonde, dhe po behet me
qellim per kompletimin e tezes te doktoratures.
Perse po me kekohet te marr pjese?
Juve po ju kerkohet qe te merrni pjese sepse ju jeni mbi moshen 18 vjet, dhe keni ardhur ne Amerike nga
nje vend tjeter.
Perse duhet te marr pjese?
Si nje pjesemarres ne kete studim ju nuk do te keni asnje perfitim direct, dhe ju nuk do te paguheni qe te
merrni pjese. Megjithate, informacioni nga ky studim mund te jete me vlere per njerez te tjere, te lindur
ne vende jashte Amerikes, duke krijuar njohuri te reja reth pershtatjes te emigranteve ne Amerike dhe
pjesemarrjes te tyre ne systemet politike Amerikane dhe vendit prej nga ata kane ardhur. Nuk ka asnje
rrezik te njohur ne lidhje me pjesemarrjen tuaj, dhe nuk do te keni asnje detyrim financiar per
pjesemarrjen tuaj ne kete studim. Identiteti tuaj do te rruhet rreptesisht, dhe ju do te identifikoheni me
nje emer te koduar ose me nje numer.
Cfare po me kerkohet te bej?
Ne qofte se bini dakord te merrni pjese ne kete studim kerkimor, do te ju kerkohet te merrni pjese ne nje
interviste personale me nje student nga Universiteti Wayne State, qe do te zgjase per rreth 30-60
minuata. Studenti do ju intervistoje ne nje vend te zjedhur prej jush, dhe do tju beje pyetje rreth menyres
qe merrni pjese ne politike ne Shtetet e Bashkuara te Amerikes dhe ne vendin e origjines suaj. Ju nuk jeni
te detyruar aspak qe ti pergjigjeni asnje pyetjeje qe nuk deshironi, dhe mund ta mbyllni intervisten ne cdo
moment.
Si mundem te marr pjese?
Ne qofte se deshironi te merrni pjese, ose ne qofte se njihni te tjere qe kane deshire te marrin pjese, ju
lutem kontaktoni Amanda Hanlin ne 313-555-1212 ose myemaladdress@wayne.edu.
Ju faleminderit per ndihmen tuaj ne kete studim kerkimor te rendesishem!
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Naucno-istrazivacki upitnik
Tema: Promjene u politickom ponasanju medju imigrantima u dijaspori
Cilj istrazivanja:
Ovo istazivanje ima za cilj da ustanovi kako se porodice proijeklom iz drugih zemalja prilagodjavaju zivotu
u SAD. Poseban cilj je bolje upoznavnje drustvenog i politickog ponasanja imiganata u SAD.
Ko sprovodi ovo istrazivanje?
Glavni istrazivac je Amanda Hanlin, kadidat za doktora nauka na odjeljenju za politicke nauke na Wayane
State Univezitetu. Njen kontakt tlefon je (313) 555-1212, myemailaddress@wayne.edu.
Ko finansira istrazivanje?
Istrazivanje se provodi u sklopu nastavnog programa na Wayne State Univerzitetu. Studija nema
finansijsku potporu, vec je dio doktorske disertacije kandidata Amande Hanlin.
Zasto vas pozivamo da ucestrvujete u ovom isttazivanju?
Vi ste zamoljeni da ucestvujete u ovom istrazivanju jer ste odrasla osoba starija od 18 godina koja je
imigrirala u SAD iz druge zemlje.
Zasto treba da ucestvujete u ovom istrazivanju?
Iako necete biti placeni da ucestvujete u ovom istrazivanju, informacije prikupljene u toku ovog
istrazivanja ce rezultirati u prikupljanju znanja o ljudima rodjenim izvan SAD i njihovim specificnim
portrebama i izazovima sa kojima se susrecu u ostvarenju svojih politickih prava i obaveza u SAD i u
njihovim zemljama porijekla.. Ovo istraivanje je anonimno, i identitet ucesnika u ovom istrazivanju je
zasticen. Svi odgovori ce biti oznaceni sifrom.
Sta se ocekuje od vas?
Ukoliko pristanete da ucestvujete u ovom istrazivanju, ucestvovacete u 30-60 minutnom razgovoru sa
kandidatom za doktora nauka, Amandom Hanlin.
Razgovor ce biti obavljen na lokaciji koju vi odaberete. Ona ce vam postavljati pitanja o vasem ucescu u
politickom procesu u SAD i u vasoj zemlji porijekla. Ne morate odgovoriti na pitanja koja ne zelite da
odgovorite i mozete prekinuti razgovor kad god zazelite.
Kako se mozete ukljuciti u ovaj projekat?
Ukoliko ste zainteresovani da ucestvujete u ovom istrazivanju ili znate nekoga ko je zainteresovan za isti,
molim Vas da uspostavite kontakt sa Amandom Hanlin na telefon (313) 555-1212,
myemailaddress@wayne.edu.
Unaprijed se zahvaljujemo na pomoci u ovom istrazivanju!
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Appendix E – Participant Information Sheet
Research Information Sheet
Title of Study: Transnational Political Behavior among Diasporic Migrants

Principal Investigator (PI):

Amanda Hanlin
Wayne State University, Political Science
313-555-1212
myemailaddress@wayne.edu

Purpose
You are being asked to be in a research study of civic and political behavior among U.S.
immigrants because you relocated to the United States from another country. This study is
being conducted at Wayne State University. The estimated number of study participants to be
enrolled at Wayne State University is about sixty (60). Please read this form and ask any
questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.
In this research study, you are being asked to participate in an in-person interview with a
Doctoral student from Wayne State University. This study is being conducted with the hope of
better understanding political participation. These interviews are a chance for individuals to tell
us about their involvement in political and civic activities. The purpose of the interview is to
help us better understand how international migrants might participate politically in affairs in
the United States as well as their country of origin.
Study Procedures
If you agree to take part in this research study, you will be asked to participate in one 30-60
minute in-person interview with a Wayne State University doctoral student.
The student will report to a location of your choice for one 30-60 minute interview.
There will only be one interview, lasting 30-60 minutes.
The student will ask you questions about your political participation habits in the United States
and your country of origin. You do not have to answer any interview questions that you do not
want to answer, and you may conclude the interview at any time.
Your responses will be kept completely confidential, meaning we will not share your name with
anyone. Your interview responses will not be linked with your identity in any way.
Benefits
As a participant in this research study, there will be no direct benefit for you; however,
information from this study may benefit other people now or in the future.
Risks
There are no known risks at this time to participation in this study.
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Study Costs
Participation in this study will be of no cost to you.

Compensation
You will not be paid for taking part in this study.
Confidentiality
All information collected about you during the course of this study will be kept confidential. You
will be identified in the research records by a code name or number. There will be no list that
links your identity with this code.
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose not to take part in this study.
If you decide to take part in the study you can later change your mind and withdraw from the
study. You are free to only answer questions that you want to answer. You are free to
withdraw from participation in this study at any time. Your decisions will not change any
present or future relationship with Wayne State University or its affiliates, or other services you
are entitled to receive.
Questions
If you have any questions about this study now or in the future, you may contact Amanda Hanlin
or one of at the following phone number 313-555-1212. If you have questions or concerns about
your rights as a research participant, the Chair of the Human Investigation Committee can be
contacted at (313) 577-1628. If you are unable to contact the research staff, or if you want to
talk to someone other than the research staff, you may also call (313) 577-1628 to ask questions
or voice concerns or complaints.
Consent to Participate in a Research Study
By completing the interview, you are agreeing to participate in this study.
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Appendix F - Human Investigation Committee (HIC)
Documents
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Contemporary migrants participate in a variety of dual social, political, and
economic processes. Sending and receiving states overtly encourage transnational
practices when they allow migrants to maintain homeland citizenship regardless of their
citizenship status in their receiving communities. Yet, we know little about migrants’
ability to enact their citizenship and their propensity to participate in sending and
receiving state networks and structures. We know also that diasporas experience and
shape transnational spaces differently than other migrants, but we have much to learn
about what influences a diaspora’s desire and ability to maintain a political affiliation
with their homeland and to become politically incorporated in their receiving
community
What does having a transnational existence mean for a diaspora’s desire and
ability to become politically active? Do diasporas have opportunities to act within
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networks in one or both of their affiliated communities? And if opportunities are
present, do they seek to participate or to withdraw? I approach transnationalism as a
site of dual-state and extra-state political engagement, and examine how differences in
sending conditions hold political significance for the individual, the community, and the
state. I gathered data via face-to-face interviews with forty participants – Albanians,
Bosnians and Kosovars who migrated to the United States in 1995 or later. I measured
type, mode and frequency of transnational political activity and assigned scores to a
spectral typology of action, including: avoidance, awareness, engagement and activism.
Within this, I observe how transnational political activity is influenced by various
independent variables.
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